OpenSSL 1.0.x

20 files changed, 13143 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/Makefile b/openssl1.0.0/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7e8d05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/ips.mk
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/archive.mk
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/patch.mk
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/32.mk
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/64.mk
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/copy.mk
+# it is not autotools, but quite close to them.
+include /usr/share/cibs/rules/autotools.mk
+
+
+description := Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) \
+	and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well \
+	as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library
+
+license := OpenSSL
+license-file := LICENSE
+
+build-depends += \
+
+name         := openssl
+home         := http://www.openssl.org
+so-version   := 1.0.0
+version-base := 1.0.1
+ips-version  := $(version-base).3
+version      := $(version-base)c
+archive      := $(name)-$(version).tar.gz
+download     := $(home)/source/$(archive)
+checksum := \
+     md5:ae412727c8c15b67880aef7bd2999b2e \
+    sha1:91b684de947cb021ac61b8c51027cc4b63d894ce \
+  sha256:2a9eb3cd4e8b114eb9179c0d3884d61658e7d8e8bf4984798a5f5bd48e325ebe \
+    size:4457113
+
+configure = ./Configure
+configure-env =
+
+configure-options.32 = solaris-x86-gcc
+configure-options.64 = solaris64-x86_64-gcc
+
+pkcs11.32 = /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so.1
+pkcs11.64 = /usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so.1
+
+# We've patched Configure to support this:
+enginesdir.32 = /usr/lib/openssl-$(version-base)/engines
+enginesdir.64 = /usr/lib/openssl-$(version-base)/engines/64
+
+# Yeah...
+libdir.32 = lib
+libdir.64 = lib/$(mach64)
+
+configure-options = \
+	-DSOLARIS_OPENSSL \
+	-DNO_WINDOWS_BRAINDEATH \
+	--pk11-libname=$(pkcs11.$(bits)) \
+	--prefix=/usr \
+	--openssldir=/etc/openssl \
+	--install_prefix=$(protodir.$(bits)) \
+	--enginesdir=$(enginesdir.$(bits)) \
+	--libdir=$(libdir.$(bits)) \
+	$(configure-options.$(bits)) \
+	no-ec \
+	no-ecdh \
+	no-ecdsa \
+	no-rc3 \
+	no-rc5 \
+	no-mdc2 \
+	no-idea \
+	no-hw_4758_cca \
+	no-hw_aep \
+	no-hw_atalla \
+	no-hw_chil \
+	no-hw_gmp \
+	no-hw_ncipher \
+	no-hw_nuron \
+	no-hw_padlock \
+	no-hw_sureware \
+	no-hw_ubsec \
+	no-hw_cswift \
+	threads \
+	shared \
+	no-static \
+
+patch-stamp: add-source-stamp
+add-source-stamp:
+	cp engines/pkcs11/* $(sourcedir)/crypto/engine/
+	cp engines/devcrypto/* $(sourcedir)/engines/
+	touch $@
+
+
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86.pl b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86062a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,765 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
+# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
+# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl [see below for
+# details].
+
+$PREFIX="aesni";	# if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
+			# generates drop-in replacement for
+			# crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-)
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+$movekey = eval($RREFIX eq "aseni" ? "*movaps" : "*movups");
+
+$len="eax";
+$rounds="ecx";
+$key="edx";
+$inp="esi";
+$out="edi";
+$rounds_="ebx";	# backup copy for $rounds
+$key_="ebp";	# backup copy for $key
+
+$inout0="xmm0";
+$inout1="xmm1";
+$inout2="xmm2";
+$rndkey0="xmm3";
+$rndkey1="xmm4";
+$ivec="xmm5";
+$in0="xmm6";
+$in1="xmm7";	$inout3="xmm7";
+
+# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1
+sub aesni_inline_generate1
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &$movekey		($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+    &$movekey		($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+    &lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+    &pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+    &set_label("${p}1_loop");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+    &jnz		(&label("${p}1_loop"));
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+}
+
+sub aesni_generate1	# fully unrolled loop
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+	&cmp		($rounds,11);
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x30,$key));
+	&jb		(&label("${p}128"));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+	&je		(&label("${p}192"));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x40,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x30,$key));
+    &set_label("${p}192");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x10,$key));
+    &set_label("${p}128");
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x60,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x70,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+}
+
+# void $PREFIX_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+# &aesni_generate1("dec");
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	# &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+
+# void $PREFIX_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+# &aesni_generate1("dec");
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(1));
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	# &call	("_aesni_decrypt1");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+
+# _aesni_[en|de]crypt[34] are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
+# factor. Why 3x subroutine is used in loops? Even though aes[enc|dec]
+# latency is 6, it turned out that it can be scheduled only every
+# *second* cycle. Thus 3x interleave is the one providing optimal
+# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
+# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
+# This is why it makes no sense to implement 2x subroutine. As soon
+# as/if Intel improves throughput by making it possible to schedule
+# the instructions in question *every* cycles I would have to
+# implement 6x interleave and use it in loop...
+sub aesni_generate3
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&shr		($rounds,1);
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&jmp		(&label("${p}3_loop"));
+    &set_label("${p}3_loop",16);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+	&jnz		(&label("${p}3_loop"));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    &$movekey		($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+}
+
+# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
+# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
+# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement  would be <20%,
+# so it's not worth it...
+sub aesni_generate4
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+    &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	&shr		($rounds,1);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	&pxor		($inout0,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout1,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor		($inout3,$rndkey0);
+	&jmp		(&label("${p}3_loop"));
+    &set_label("${p}3_loop",16);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+	&dec		($rounds);
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+	&$movekey	($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+	eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+	&jnz		(&label("${p}3_loop"));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+    &$movekey		($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}	($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+    eval"&aes${p}last	($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+    &ret();
+    &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+}
+&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate3("dec");
+&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate4("dec");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
+# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
+#                         size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                         int enc);
+&function_begin("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(4));
+	&cmp	($len,16);
+	&jb	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+	&and	($len,-16);
+	&test	($rounds,$rounds)
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	($key_,$key);		# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);	# backup $rounds
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_decrypt"));
+
+	&sub	($len,0x40);
+	&jbe	(&label("ecb_enc_tail"));
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_enc_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_loop3",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&sub	($len,0x30);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x30,$out),$inout0);
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x20,$out),$inout1);
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x10,$out),$inout2);
+	&ja	(&label("ecb_enc_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_tail");
+	&add	($len,0x40);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+	&cmp	($len,0x10);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_enc_one"));
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_enc_two"));
+	&cmp	($len,0x30);
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_enc_three"));
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt4");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_one",16);
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	# &call	("_aesni_encrypt1");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_decrypt",16);
+	&sub	($len,0x40);
+	&jbe	(&label("ecb_dec_tail"));
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_dec_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_loop3",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&sub	($len,0x30);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x30,$out),$inout0);
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x20,$out),$inout1);
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x10,$out),$inout2);
+	&ja	(&label("ecb_dec_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_tail");
+	&add	($len,0x40);
+	&jz	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+	&cmp	($len,0x10);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_dec_one"));
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_dec_two"));
+	&cmp	($len,0x30);
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&je	(&label("ecb_dec_three"));
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt4");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_one",16);
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	# &call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_two",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&jmp	(&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_three",16);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+
+&set_label("ecb_ret");
+&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+}
+
+# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
+#                           size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#                           unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+	&mov	($inp,&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($len,&wparam(2));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));
+	&test	($len,$len);
+	&mov	($key_,&wparam(4));
+	&jz	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+	&cmp	(&wparam(5),0);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0,$key_));	# load IV
+	&mov	($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+	&mov	($key_,$key);		# backup $key
+	&mov	($rounds_,$rounds);	# backup $rounds
+	&je	(&label("cbc_decrypt"));
+
+	&movaps	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&cmp	($len,16);
+	&jb	(&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+	&sub	($len,16);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("enc");	# &call	("_aesni_encrypt3");
+	&sub	($len,16);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0);
+	&jnc	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+	&add	($len,16);
+	&jnz	(&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+	&movaps	($ivec,$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
+	&mov	("ecx",$len);		# zaps $rounds
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb
+	&mov	("ecx",16);		# zero tail
+	&sub	("ecx",$len);
+	&xor	("eax","eax");		# zaps $len
+	&data_word(0xAAF3F689);		# rep stosb
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(-16,$out));	# rewind $out by 1 block
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_);	# restore $rounds
+	&mov	($inp,$out);		# $inp and $out are the same
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_decrypt",16);
+	&sub	($len,0x40);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_tail"));
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop3",16);
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&movaps	($in0,$inout0);
+	&movaps	($in1,$inout1);
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&sub	($len,0x30);
+	&lea	($inp,&DWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$in0);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(-0x10,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout2,$in1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x30,$out),$inout0);
+	&mov	($rounds,$rounds_)	# restore $rounds
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x20,$out),$inout1);
+	&mov	($key,$key_);		# restore $key
+	&movups	(&QWP(-0x10,$out),$inout2);
+	&ja	(&label("cbc_dec_loop3"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
+	&add	($len,0x40);
+	&jz	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+	&movups	($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x10);
+	&movaps	($in0,$inout0);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_one"));
+	&movups	($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x20);
+	&movaps	($in1,$inout1);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_two"));
+	&movups	($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&cmp	($len,0x30);
+	&jbe	(&label("cbc_dec_three"));
+	&movups	($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt4");
+	&movups	($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+	&movups	($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$in0);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$rndkey0);
+	&pxor	($inout3,$rndkey1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout3);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_one");
+	&aesni_inline_generate1("dec");	# &call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&movaps	($ivec,$in0);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_two");
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$in0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout1);
+	&movaps	($ivec,$in1);
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_three");
+	&call	("_aesni_decrypt3");
+	&pxor	($inout0,$ivec);
+	&pxor	($inout1,$in0);
+	&pxor	($inout2,$in1);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&movups	(&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+	&movaps	($inout0,$inout2);
+	&movups	($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+	&lea	($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
+	&and	($len,15);
+	&jnz	(&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+	&jmp	(&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial");
+	&mov	($key_,"esp");
+	&sub	("esp",16);
+	&and	("esp",-16);
+	&movaps	(&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
+	&mov	($inp,"esp");
+	&mov	("ecx",$len);
+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);		# rep movsb
+	&mov	("esp",$key_);
+
+&set_label("cbc_ret");
+	&mov	($key_,&wparam(4));
+	&movups	(&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec);	# output IV
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+
+# Mechanical port from aesni-x86_64.pl.
+#
+# _aesni_set_encrypt_key is private interface,
+# input:
+#	"eax"	const unsigned char *userKey
+#	$rounds	int bits
+#	$key	AES_KEY *key
+# output:
+#	"eax"	return code
+#	$round	rounds
+
+&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&test	("eax","eax");
+	&jz	(&label("bad_pointer"));
+	&test	($key,$key);
+	&jz	(&label("bad_pointer"));
+
+	&movups	("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax"));	# pull first 128 bits of *userKey
+	&pxor	("xmm4","xmm4");	# low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+	&lea	($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&cmp	($rounds,256);
+	&je	(&label("14rounds"));
+	&cmp	($rounds,192);
+	&je	(&label("12rounds"));
+	&cmp	($rounds,128);
+	&jne	(&label("bad_keybits"));
+
+&set_label("10rounds",16);
+	&mov		($rounds,9);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");	# round 0
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01);		# round 1
+	&call		(&label("key_128_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x2);		# round 2
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04);		# round 3
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08);		# round 4
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10);		# round 5
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20);		# round 6
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x40);		# round 7
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x80);		# round 8
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x1b);		# round 9
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x36);		# round 10
+	&call		(&label("key_128"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_128",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_128_cold");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100,);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111);	# critical path
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("12rounds",16);
+	&movq		("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax"));	# remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+	&mov		($rounds,11);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0")		# round 0
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01);		# round 1,2
+	&call		(&label("key_192a_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02);		# round 2,3
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04);		# round 4,5
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08);		# round 5,6
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10);		# round 7,8
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20);		# round 8,9
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40);		# round 10,11
+	&call		(&label("key_192a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x80);		# round 11,12
+	&call		(&label("key_192b"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_192a",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_192a_cold",16);
+	&movaps		("xmm5","xmm2");
+&set_label("key_192b_warm");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&movaps		("xmm3","xmm2");
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+	&pslldq		("xmm3",4);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm1",0b01010101);	# critical path
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&pshufd		("xmm3","xmm0",0b11111111);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm3");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_192b",16);
+	&movaps		("xmm3","xmm0");
+	&shufps		("xmm5","xmm0",0b01000100);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm5");
+	&shufps		("xmm3","xmm2",0b01001110);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(16,$key),"xmm3");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+	&jmp		(&label("key_192b_warm"));
+
+&set_label("14rounds",16);
+	&movups		("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax"));	# remaining half of *userKey
+	&mov		($rounds,13);
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");	# round 0
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");	# round 1
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01);		# round 2
+	&call		(&label("key_256a_cold"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01);		# round 3
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02);		# round 4
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x02);		# round 5
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04);		# round 6
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04);		# round 7
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08);		# round 8
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08);		# round 9
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10);		# round 10
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10);		# round 11
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20);		# round 12
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20);		# round 13
+	&call		(&label("key_256b"));
+	&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40);		# round 14
+	&call		(&label("key_256a"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&mov		(&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
+	&xor		("eax","eax");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_256a",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_256a_cold");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm4");
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111);	# critical path
+	&pxor		("xmm0","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("key_256b",16);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm2",0b00010000);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&shufps		("xmm4","xmm2",0b10001100);
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm4");
+	&pshufd		("xmm1","xmm1",0b10101010);	# critical path
+	&pxor		("xmm2","xmm1");
+	&ret();
+
+&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
+	&mov	("eax",-1);
+	&ret	();
+&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
+	&mov	("eax",-2);
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_encrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+#                              AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&call	("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_decrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+#                              AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+	&mov	("eax",&wparam(0));
+	&mov	($rounds,&wparam(1));
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&call	("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+	&mov	($key,&wparam(2));
+	&shl	($rounds,4)	# rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	&test	("eax","eax");
+	&jnz	(&label("dec_key_ret"));
+	&lea	("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds));	# end of key schedule
+
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# just swap
+	&$movekey	("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm1");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+
+&set_label("dec_key_inverse");
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# swap and inverse
+	&$movekey	("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+	&aesimc		("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&aesimc		("xmm1","xmm1");
+	&lea		($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+	&lea		("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+	&cmp		("eax",$key);
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(16,"eax"),"xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm1");
+	&ja		(&label("dec_key_inverse"));
+
+	&$movekey	("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));	# inverse middle
+	&aesimc		("xmm0","xmm0");
+	&$movekey	(&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+	&xor		("eax","eax");		# return success
+&set_label("dec_key_ret");
+	&ret	();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86_64.pl b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86_64.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdc076e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,991 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
+# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
+# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl [see below for
+# details].
+
+$PREFIX="aesni";	# if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
+			# generates drop-in replacement for
+			# crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl:-)
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output  = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+
+$movkey = $PREFIX eq "aesni" ? "movaps" : "movups";
+@_4args=$win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
+		("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");	# Unix order
+
+$code=".text\n";
+
+$rounds="%eax";	# input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!!
+# this is natural Unix argument order for public $PREFIX_[ecb|cbc]_encrypt ...
+$inp="%rdi";
+$out="%rsi";
+$len="%rdx";
+$key="%rcx";	# input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!!
+$ivp="%r8";	# cbc
+
+$rnds_="%r10d";	# backup copy for $rounds
+$key_="%r11";	# backup copy for $key
+
+# %xmm register layout
+$inout0="%xmm0";	$inout1="%xmm1";
+$inout2="%xmm2";	$inout3="%xmm3";
+$rndkey0="%xmm4";	$rndkey1="%xmm5";
+
+$iv="%xmm6";		$in0="%xmm7";	# used in CBC decrypt
+$in1="%xmm8";		$in2="%xmm9";
+
+# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1.
+#
+# Why folded loop? Because aes[enc|dec] is slow enough to accommodate
+# cycles which take care of loop variables...
+{ my $sn;
+sub aesni_generate1 {
+my ($p,$key,$rounds)=@_;
+++$sn;
+$code.=<<___;
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	lea	32($key),$key
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout0
+.Loop_${p}1_$sn:
+	aes${p}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	dec	$rounds
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	jnz	.Loop_${p}1_$sn	# loop body is 16 bytes
+	aes${p}last	$rndkey1,$inout0
+___
+}}
+# void $PREFIX_[en|de]crypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+#
+{ my ($inp,$out,$key) = @_4args;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_encrypt:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# pull $rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# output
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
+
+.globl	${PREFIX}_decrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_decrypt:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0		# load input
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# pull $rounds
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)		# output
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_decrypt, .-${PREFIX}_decrypt
+___
+}
+
+# _aesni_[en|de]crypt[34] are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
+# factor. Why 3x subroutine is used in loops? Even though aes[enc|dec]
+# latency is 6, it turned out that it can be scheduled only every
+# *second* cycle. Thus 3x interleave is the one providing optimal
+# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
+# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
+# This is why it makes no sense to implement 2x subroutine. As soon
+# as/if Intel improves throughput by making it possible to schedule
+# the instructions in question *every* cycles I would have to
+# implement 6x interleave and use it in loop...
+sub aesni_generate3 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-2] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt3,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt3:
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	shr	\$1,$rounds
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	lea	32($key),$key
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout2
+
+.L${dir}_loop3:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	dec		$rounds
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		16($key),$rndkey1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	lea		32($key),$key
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop3
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt3,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt3
+___
+}
+# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
+# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
+# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%,
+# so it's not worth it...
+sub aesni_generate4 {
+my $dir=shift;
+# As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not*
+# preserved. $inout[0-3] is cipher/clear text...
+$code.=<<___;
+.type	_aesni_${dir}rypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_aesni_${dir}rypt4:
+	$movkey	($key),$rndkey0
+	shr	\$1,$rounds
+	$movkey	16($key),$rndkey1
+	lea	32($key),$key
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	pxor	$rndkey0,$inout3
+
+.L${dir}_loop4:
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	dec		$rounds
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	$movkey		16($key),$rndkey1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	lea		32($key),$key
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	jnz		.L${dir}_loop4
+
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout0
+	$movkey		($key),$rndkey0
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout1
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout2
+	aes${dir}	$rndkey1,$inout3
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout0
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout1
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout2
+	aes${dir}last	$rndkey0,$inout3
+	ret
+.size	_aesni_${dir}rypt4,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt4
+___
+}
+&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate3("dec");
+&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate4("dec");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
+# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
+#			  size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			  int enc);
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	aesni_ecb_encrypt
+.type	aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5
+.align	16
+aesni_ecb_encrypt:
+	cmp	\$16,$len		# check length
+	jb	.Lecb_ret
+
+	mov	240($key),$rounds	# pull $rounds
+	and	\$-16,$len
+	mov	$key,$key_		# backup $key
+	test	%r8d,%r8d		# 5th argument
+	mov	$rounds,$rnds_		# backup $rounds
+	jz	.Lecb_decrypt
+#--------------------------- ECB ENCRYPT ------------------------------#
+	sub	\$0x40,$len
+	jbe	.Lecb_enc_tail
+	jmp	.Lecb_enc_loop3
+.align 16
+.Lecb_enc_loop3:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	call	_aesni_encrypt3
+	sub	\$0x30,$len
+	lea	0x30($inp),$inp
+	lea	0x30($out),$out
+	movups	$inout0,-0x30($out)
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout1,-0x20($out)
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout2,-0x10($out)
+	ja	.Lecb_enc_loop3
+
+.Lecb_enc_tail:
+	add	\$0x40,$len
+	jz	.Lecb_ret
+
+	cmp	\$0x10,$len
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	je	.Lecb_enc_one
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Lecb_enc_two
+	cmp	\$0x30,$len
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	je	.Lecb_enc_three
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	call	_aesni_encrypt4
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_one:
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_two:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_enc_three:
+	call	_aesni_encrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+#--------------------------- ECB DECRYPT ------------------------------#
+.align	16
+.Lecb_decrypt:
+	sub	\$0x40,$len
+	jbe	.Lecb_dec_tail
+	jmp	.Lecb_dec_loop3
+.align 16
+.Lecb_dec_loop3:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	sub	\$0x30,$len
+	lea	0x30($inp),$inp
+	lea	0x30($out),$out
+	movups	$inout0,-0x30($out)
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout1,-0x20($out)
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout2,-0x10($out)
+	ja	.Lecb_dec_loop3
+
+.Lecb_dec_tail:
+	add	\$0x40,$len
+	jz	.Lecb_ret
+
+	cmp	\$0x10,$len
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	je	.Lecb_dec_one
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	je	.Lecb_dec_two
+	cmp	\$0x30,$len
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	je	.Lecb_dec_three
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	call	_aesni_decrypt4
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movups	$inout3,0x30($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_one:
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_two:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	jmp	.Lecb_ret
+.align	16
+.Lecb_dec_three:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+
+.Lecb_ret:
+	ret
+.size	aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt
+___
+}
+
+# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
+#			    size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+#			    unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+$reserved = $win64?0x40:-0x18;	# used in decrypt
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+.type	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
+	test	$len,$len		# check length
+	jz	.Lcbc_ret
+
+	mov	240($key),$rnds_	# pull $rounds
+	mov	$key,$key_		# backup $key
+	test	%r9d,%r9d		# 6th argument
+	jz	.Lcbc_decrypt
+#--------------------------- CBC ENCRYPT ------------------------------#
+	movups	($ivp),$inout0		# load iv as initial state
+	cmp	\$16,$len
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	jb	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jmp	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+.align 16
+.Lcbc_enc_loop:
+	movups	($inp),$inout1		# load input
+	lea	16($inp),$inp
+	pxor	$inout1,$inout0
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	lea	16($out),$out
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds		# restore $rounds
+	mov	$key_,$key		# restore $key
+	movups	$inout0,-16($out)	# store output
+	jnc	.Lcbc_enc_loop
+	add	\$16,$len
+	jnz	.Lcbc_enc_tail
+	movups	$inout0,($ivp)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_ret
+
+.Lcbc_enc_tail:
+	mov	$len,%rcx	# zaps $key
+	xchg	$inp,$out	# $inp is %rsi and $out is %rdi now
+	.long	0x9066A4F3	# rep movsb
+	mov	\$16,%ecx	# zero tail
+	sub	$len,%rcx
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	.long	0x9066AAF3	# rep stosb
+	lea	-16(%rdi),%rdi	# rewind $out by 1 block
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds	# restore $rounds
+	mov	%rdi,%rsi	# $inp and $out are the same
+	mov	$key_,$key	# restore $key
+	xor	$len,$len	# len=16
+	jmp	.Lcbc_enc_loop	# one more spin
+#--------------------------- CBC DECRYPT ------------------------------#
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_decrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+.Lcbc_decrypt_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+	movups	($ivp),$iv
+	sub	\$0x40,$len
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_tail
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_loop3
+.align 16
+.Lcbc_dec_loop3:
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	movaps	$inout0,$in0
+	movaps	$inout1,$in1
+	movaps	$inout2,$in2
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	sub	\$0x30,$len
+	lea	0x30($inp),$inp
+	lea	0x30($out),$out
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movaps	$in2,$iv
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movups	$inout0,-0x30($out)
+	mov	$rnds_,$rounds	# restore $rounds
+	movups	$inout1,-0x20($out)
+	mov	$key_,$key	# restore $key
+	movups	$inout2,-0x10($out)
+	ja	.Lcbc_dec_loop3
+
+.Lcbc_dec_tail:
+	add	\$0x40,$len
+	movups	$iv,($ivp)
+	jz	.Lcbc_dec_ret
+
+	movups	($inp),$inout0
+	cmp	\$0x10,$len
+	movaps	$inout0,$in0
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_one
+	movups	0x10($inp),$inout1
+	cmp	\$0x20,$len
+	movaps	$inout1,$in1
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_two
+	movups	0x20($inp),$inout2
+	cmp	\$0x30,$len
+	movaps	$inout2,$in2
+	jbe	.Lcbc_dec_three
+	movups	0x30($inp),$inout3
+	call	_aesni_decrypt4
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movups	0x30($inp),$iv
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	pxor	$in2,$inout3
+	movups	$inout2,0x20($out)
+	movaps	$inout3,$inout0
+	lea	0x30($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_one:
+___
+	&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
+$code.=<<___;
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	movaps	$in0,$iv
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_two:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	movaps	$in1,$iv
+	movaps	$inout1,$inout0
+	lea	0x10($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_three:
+	call	_aesni_decrypt3
+	pxor	$iv,$inout0
+	pxor	$in0,$inout1
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	pxor	$in1,$inout2
+	movups	$inout1,0x10($out)
+	movaps	$in2,$iv
+	movaps	$inout2,$inout0
+	lea	0x20($out),$out
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+.align	16
+.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected:
+	and	\$15,$len
+	movups	$iv,($ivp)
+	jnz	.Lcbc_dec_tail_partial
+	movups	$inout0,($out)
+	jmp	.Lcbc_dec_ret
+.Lcbc_dec_tail_partial:
+	movaps	$inout0,$reserved(%rsp)
+	mov	$out,%rdi
+	mov	$len,%rcx
+	lea	$reserved(%rsp),%rsi
+	.long	0x9066A4F3	# rep movsb
+
+.Lcbc_dec_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	lea	0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_ret:
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+___
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_[en|de]crypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey,
+#				int bits, AES_KEY *key)
+{ my ($inp,$bits,$key) = @_4args;
+  $bits =~ s/%r/%e/;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08	# sub rsp,8
+	call	_aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	shl	\$4,$bits		# rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
+	test	%eax,%eax
+	jnz	.Ldec_key_ret
+	lea	16($key,$bits),$inp	# points at the end of key schedule
+
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# just swap
+	$movkey	($inp),%xmm1
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($inp)
+	$movkey	%xmm1,($key)
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	lea	-16($inp),$inp
+
+.Ldec_key_inverse:
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# swap and inverse
+	$movkey	($inp),%xmm1
+	aesimc	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	aesimc	%xmm1,%xmm1
+	lea	16($key),$key
+	lea	-16($inp),$inp
+	cmp	$key,$inp
+	$movkey	%xmm0,16($inp)
+	$movkey	%xmm1,-16($key)
+	ja	.Ldec_key_inverse
+
+	$movkey	($key),%xmm0		# inverse middle
+	aesimc	%xmm0,%xmm0
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($inp)
+.Ldec_key_ret:
+	add	\$8,%rsp
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key:
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+___
+
+# This is based on submission by
+#
+#	Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+#	Vinodh Gopal <vinodh.gopal@intel.com>
+#	Kahraman Akdemir
+#
+# Agressively optimized in respect to aeskeygenassist's critical path
+# and is contained in %xmm0-5 to meet Win64 ABI requirement.
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+.type	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key:
+_aesni_set_encrypt_key:
+	.byte	0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08	# sub rsp,8
+	test	$inp,$inp
+	mov	\$-1,%rax
+	jz	.Lenc_key_ret
+	test	$key,$key
+	jz	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+	movups	($inp),%xmm0		# pull first 128 bits of *userKey
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm4		# low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+	lea	16($key),%rax
+	cmp	\$256,$bits
+	je	.L14rounds
+	cmp	\$192,$bits
+	je	.L12rounds
+	cmp	\$128,$bits
+	jne	.Lbad_keybits
+
+.L10rounds:
+	mov	\$9,$bits			# 10 rounds for 128-bit key
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 1
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 4
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 7
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x80,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1b,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x36,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 10
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_128
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,80(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%eax,%eax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L12rounds:
+	movq	16($inp),%xmm2			# remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+	mov	\$11,$bits			# 12 rounds for 192
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 1,2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 2,3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 4,5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 5,6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 7,8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 8,9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 10,11
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x80,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 11,12
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_192b
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,48(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%rax, %rax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.L14rounds:
+	movups	16($inp),%xmm2			# remaning half of *userKey
+	mov	\$13,$bits			# 14 rounds for 256
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+	$movkey	%xmm0,($key)			# round 0
+	$movkey	%xmm2,16($key)			# round 1
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 2
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a_cold
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 3
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 4
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 5
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 6
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 7
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 8
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 9
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 10
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 11
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 12
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1	# round 13
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256b
+	aeskeygenassist	\$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1	# round 14
+	call		.Lkey_expansion_256a
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	mov	$bits,16(%rax)	# 240(%rdx)
+	xor	%rax,%rax
+	jmp	.Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align	16
+.Lbad_keybits:
+	mov	\$-2,%rax
+.Lenc_key_ret:
+	add	\$8,%rsp
+	ret
+.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key:
+
+.align	16
+.Lkey_expansion_128:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_128_cold:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4, %xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4, %xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_192a:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_192a_cold:
+	movaps	%xmm2, %xmm5
+.Lkey_expansion_192b_warm:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	movaps	%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pslldq	\$4,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b01010101,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b11111111,%xmm0,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm2
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_192b:
+	movaps	%xmm0,%xmm3
+	shufps	\$0b01000100,%xmm0,%xmm5
+	$movkey	%xmm5,(%rax)
+	shufps	\$0b01001110,%xmm2,%xmm3
+	$movkey	%xmm3,16(%rax)
+	lea	32(%rax),%rax
+	jmp	.Lkey_expansion_192b_warm
+
+.align	16
+.Lkey_expansion_256a:
+	$movkey	%xmm2,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+.Lkey_expansion_256a_cold:
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm0
+	pshufd	\$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm0
+	ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lkey_expansion_256b:
+	$movkey	%xmm0,(%rax)
+	lea	16(%rax),%rax
+
+	shufps	\$0b00010000,%xmm2,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm2
+	shufps	\$0b10001100,%xmm2,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm2
+	pshufd	\$0b10101010,%xmm1,%xmm1	# critical path
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm2
+	ret
+.size	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz  "AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align	64
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type	cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+cbc_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_decrypt(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<"prologue" label
+	jb	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_decrypt_body(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<cbc_decrypt_body
+	jb	.Lrestore_rax
+
+	lea	.Lcbc_ret(%rip),%r10
+	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>="epilogue" label
+	jae	.Lin_prologue
+
+	lea	0(%rax),%rsi		# top of stack
+	lea	512($context),%rdi	# &context.Xmm6
+	mov	\$8,%ecx		# 4*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+	lea	0x58(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer
+	jmp	.Lin_prologue
+
+.Lrestore_rax:
+	mov	120($context),%rax
+.Lin_prologue:
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size	cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler
+
+.type	ecb_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+ecb_se_handler:
+	push	%rsi
+	push	%rdi
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%r12
+	push	%r13
+	push	%r14
+	push	%r15
+	pushfq
+	sub	\$64,%rsp
+
+	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
+	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
+	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
+	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
+	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
+
+.Lcommon_seh_exit:
+
+	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
+	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
+	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
+	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
+
+	mov	$disp,%rsi
+	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
+	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
+	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
+	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
+	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
+	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
+	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
+	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
+	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
+	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
+	add	\$64,%rsp
+	popfq
+	pop	%r15
+	pop	%r14
+	pop	%r13
+	pop	%r12
+	pop	%rbp
+	pop	%rbx
+	pop	%rdi
+	pop	%rsi
+	ret
+.size	cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler
+
+.section	.pdata
+.align	4
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_ecb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_ecb_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_ecb
+
+	.rva	.LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_cbc
+
+	.rva	${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_key
+
+	.rva	${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key
+	.rva	.LSEH_info_key
+.section	.xdata
+.align	8
+.LSEH_info_ecb:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	ecb_se_handler
+.LSEH_info_cbc:
+	.byte	9,0,0,0
+	.rva	cbc_se_handler
+.LSEH_info_key:
+	.byte	0x01,0x04,0x01,0x00
+	.byte	0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00
+___
+}
+
+sub rex {
+ local *opcode=shift;
+ my ($dst,$src)=@_;
+
+   if ($dst>=8 || $src>=8) {
+	$rex=0x40;
+	$rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8);
+	$rex|=0x01 if($src>=8);
+	push @opcode,$rex;
+   }
+}
+
+sub aesni {
+  my $line=shift;
+  my @opcode=(0x66);
+
+    if ($line=~/(aeskeygenassist)\s+\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	rex(\@opcode,$4,$3);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf;
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($3&7)|(($4&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	my $c=$2;
+	push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c;
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) {
+	my %opcodelet = (
+		"aesimc" => 0xdb,
+		"aesenc" => 0xdc,	"aesenclast" => 0xdd,
+		"aesdec" => 0xde,	"aesdeclast" => 0xdf
+	);
+	return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1}));
+	rex(\@opcode,$3,$2);
+	push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1};
+	push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3);	# ModR/M
+	return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode);
+    }
+    return $line;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/eng_aesni.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/eng_aesni.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f4d35d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/aesni/eng_aesni.c
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+/*
+ * Support for Intel AES-NI intruction set
+ *   Author: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+ *
+ * Intel AES-NI is a new set of Single Instruction Multiple Data
+ * (SIMD) instructions that are going to be introduced in the next
+ * generation of Intel processor, as of 2009. These instructions
+ * enable fast and secure data encryption and decryption, using the
+ * Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), defined by FIPS Publication
+ * number 197.  The architecture introduces six instructions that
+ * offer full hardware support for AES. Four of them support high
+ * performance data encryption and decryption, and the other two
+ * instructions support the AES key expansion procedure.
+ *
+ * The white paper can be downloaded from:
+ *   http://softwarecommunity.intel.com/isn/downloads/intelavx/AES-Instructions-Set_WP.pdf
+ *
+ * This file is based on engines/e_padlock.c
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_AES_NI) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AES)
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+
+/* AES-NI is available *ONLY* on some x86 CPUs.  Not only that it
+   doesn't exist elsewhere, but it even can't be compiled on other
+   platforms! */
+#undef COMPILE_HW_AESNI
+#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
+     defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
+#define COMPILE_HW_AESNI
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_aesni (void);
+#endif
+
+void ENGINE_load_aesni (void)
+{
+/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
+#ifdef COMPILE_HW_AESNI
+	ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_aesni();
+	if (!toadd)
+		return;
+	ENGINE_add (toadd);
+	ENGINE_free (toadd);
+	ERR_clear_error ();
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef COMPILE_HW_AESNI
+int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+			      AES_KEY *key);
+int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+			      AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+		       const AES_KEY *key);
+void aesni_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+		       const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+			   unsigned char *out,
+			   size_t length,
+			   const AES_KEY *key,
+			   int enc);
+void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+			   unsigned char *out,
+			   size_t length,
+			   const AES_KEY *key,
+			   unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+
+/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */
+static int aesni_init(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* Cipher Stuff */
+static int aesni_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+				const int **nids, int nid);
+
+#define AESNI_MIN_ALIGN	16
+#define AESNI_ALIGN(x) \
+	((void *)(((unsigned long)(x)+AESNI_MIN_ALIGN-1)&~(AESNI_MIN_ALIGN-1)))
+
+/* Engine names */
+static const char   aesni_id[] = "aesni",
+		    aesni_name[] = "Intel AES-NI engine",
+		    no_aesni_name[] = "Intel AES-NI engine (no-aesni)";
+
+/* ===== Engine "management" functions ===== */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+typedef unsigned __int64 IA32CAP;
+#else
+typedef unsigned long long IA32CAP;
+#endif
+
+/* Prepare the ENGINE structure for registration */
+static int
+aesni_bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	int engage;
+	if (sizeof(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P) > 4) {
+		engage = (int)((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P >> 30) >> 27) & 1;
+	} else {
+		IA32CAP OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(void);
+		engage = (int)(OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid() >> 57) & 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Register everything or return with an error */
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, aesni_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engage ? aesni_name : no_aesni_name) ||
+
+	    !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, aesni_init) ||
+	    (engage && !ENGINE_set_ciphers (e, aesni_ciphers))
+	    )
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Everything looks good */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Constructor */
+static ENGINE *
+ENGINE_aesni(void)
+{
+	ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!eng) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!aesni_bind_helper(eng)) {
+		ENGINE_free(eng);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return eng;
+}
+
+/* Check availability of the engine */
+static int
+aesni_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_128_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_128_cfb	NID_aes_128_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_128_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_128_ofb	NID_aes_128_ofb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_192_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_192_cfb	NID_aes_192_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_192_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_192_ofb	NID_aes_192_ofb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_256_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_cfb)
+#define NID_aes_256_cfb	NID_aes_256_cfb128
+#endif
+
+#if defined(NID_aes_256_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_ofb)
+#define NID_aes_256_ofb	NID_aes_256_ofb128
+#endif
+
+/* List of supported ciphers. */
+static int aesni_cipher_nids[] = {
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	NID_aes_128_cfb,
+	NID_aes_128_ofb,
+
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	NID_aes_192_cfb,
+	NID_aes_192_ofb,
+
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	NID_aes_256_cfb,
+	NID_aes_256_ofb,
+};
+static int aesni_cipher_nids_num =
+	(sizeof(aesni_cipher_nids)/sizeof(aesni_cipher_nids[0]));
+
+typedef struct
+{
+	AES_KEY ks;
+	unsigned int _pad1[3];
+} AESNI_KEY;
+
+static int
+aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *user_key,
+		    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	int ret;
+	AES_KEY *key = AESNI_ALIGN(ctx->cipher_data);
+
+	if ((ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE
+	    || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE
+	    || enc)
+		ret=aesni_set_encrypt_key(user_key, ctx->key_len * 8, key);
+	else
+		ret=aesni_set_decrypt_key(user_key, ctx->key_len * 8, key);
+
+	if(ret < 0) {
+		EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY,EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_cipher_ecb(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+		 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{	AES_KEY *key = AESNI_ALIGN(ctx->cipher_data);
+	aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, inl, key, ctx->encrypt);
+	return 1;
+}
+static int aesni_cipher_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+		 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{	AES_KEY *key = AESNI_ALIGN(ctx->cipher_data);
+	aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, inl, key,
+			      ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
+	return 1;
+}
+static int aesni_cipher_cfb(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+		 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{	AES_KEY *key = AESNI_ALIGN(ctx->cipher_data);
+	CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, inl, key, ctx->iv,
+				&ctx->num, ctx->encrypt,
+				(block128_f)aesni_encrypt);
+	return 1;
+}
+static int aesni_cipher_ofb(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+		 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{	AES_KEY *key = AESNI_ALIGN(ctx->cipher_data);
+	CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, inl, key, ctx->iv,
+				&ctx->num, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE		16
+
+#define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_ECB	AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CBC	AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+#define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_OFB	1
+#define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CFB	1
+
+/* Declaring so many ciphers by hand would be a pain.
+   Instead introduce a bit of preprocessor magic :-) */
+#define	DECLARE_AES_EVP(ksize,lmode,umode)	\
+static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##ksize##_##lmode = {	\
+	NID_aes_##ksize##_##lmode,			\
+	EVP_CIPHER_block_size_##umode,			\
+	ksize / 8,					\
+	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,					\
+	0 | EVP_CIPH_##umode##_MODE,			\
+	aesni_init_key,				\
+	aesni_cipher_##lmode,				\
+	NULL,						\
+	sizeof(AESNI_KEY),				\
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,				\
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,				\
+	NULL,						\
+	NULL						\
+}
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(128,ofb,OFB);
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(192,ofb,OFB);
+
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,ecb,ECB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,cbc,CBC);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,cfb,CFB);
+DECLARE_AES_EVP(256,ofb,OFB);
+
+static int
+aesni_ciphers (ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+		      const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+	/* No specific cipher => return a list of supported nids ... */
+	if (!cipher) {
+		*nids = aesni_cipher_nids;
+		return aesni_cipher_nids_num;
+	}
+
+	/* ... or the requested "cipher" otherwise */
+	switch (nid) {
+	case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_128_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+		*cipher = &aesni_128_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_128_cfb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_128_cfb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_128_ofb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_128_ofb;
+		break;
+
+	case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_192_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+		*cipher = &aesni_192_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_192_cfb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_192_cfb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_192_ofb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_192_ofb;
+		break;
+
+	case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_256_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+		*cipher = &aesni_256_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_256_cfb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_256_cfb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_256_ofb:
+		*cipher = &aesni_256_ofb;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		/* Sorry, we don't support this NID */
+		*cipher = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* COMPILE_HW_AESNI */
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_AESNI) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AES) */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67bd085
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <cryptoutil.h>
+#include <sys/crypto/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/crypto/api.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+
+#define	DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME "devcrypto engine"
+#include "e_devcrypto_err.c"
+
+/* DEVCRYPTO CONTEXT */
+typedef struct devcrypto_ctx {
+	uint_t session_id;
+} devcrypto_ctx_t;
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+typedef enum {
+	DEV_DES_CBC,
+	DEV_DES3_CBC,
+	DEV_DES_ECB,
+	DEV_DES3_ECB,
+	DEV_RC4,
+	DEV_AES_128_CBC,
+	DEV_AES_192_CBC,
+	DEV_AES_256_CBC,
+	DEV_AES_128_ECB,
+	DEV_AES_192_ECB,
+	DEV_AES_256_ECB,
+	DEV_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	DEV_AES_128_CTR,
+	DEV_AES_192_CTR,
+	DEV_AES_256_CTR,
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	DEV_CIPHER_MAX
+} DEV_CIPHER_ID;
+
+typedef struct devcrypto_cipher {
+	DEV_CIPHER_ID		id;
+	int			nid;
+	int			iv_len;
+	int			min_key_len;
+	int			max_key_len;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	unsigned long		flags;
+	crypto_mech_type_t	pn_internal_number;
+} devcrypto_cipher_t;
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID = "devcrypto";
+static const char *ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_NAME = "/dev/crypto engine support";
+static const char *CRYPTO_DEVICE = "/dev/crypto";
+
+/* static variables */
+static int kernel_fd = -1;
+static int kernel_fd_ref = 0;
+static int slot_count = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID *kernel_provider_id = NULL;
+static int cipher_count = 0;
+static int *cipher_nids = NULL;
+pthread_mutex_t *kernel_fd_lock;
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NIDs for AES counter mode. They will be defined during the engine
+ * initialization.
+ */
+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Table for all supported symmetric ciphers.
+ */
+static devcrypto_cipher_t cipher_table[] = {
+	/* id,			nid,		iv_len, min_, max_key_len, */
+		/* key_type,	mech_type, flags, pn_internal_number */
+	{ DEV_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_DES3_CBC,		NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_DES3_ECB,		NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
+		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
+		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, 0, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/*
+	 * For the following 3 AES counter mode entries, we don't know the
+	 * NIDs until the engine is initialized
+	 */
+	{ DEV_AES_128_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING,
+		CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_192_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING,
+		CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+	{ DEV_AES_256_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING,
+		CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID},
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	};
+
+
+/* Formal declaration for functions in EVP_CIPHER structure */
+static int devcrypto_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+    const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int devcrypto_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Algorithms
+ *
+ * OpenSSL's libcrypto EVP stuff. This is how this engine gets wired to EVP.
+ * EVP_CIPHER is defined in evp.h.  To maintain binary compatibility the
+ * definition cannot be modified.
+ * Stuff specific to the devcrypto engine is kept in devcrypto_ctx_t, which is
+ * pointed to by cipher_data or md_data.
+ *
+ * Fields: nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags,
+ *	init(), do_cipher(), cleanup(),
+ *	ctx_size,
+ *	set_asn1_parameters(), get_asn1_parameters(), ctrl(), app_data
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_des_cbc = {
+	NID_des_cbc,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_3des_cbc = {
+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector, therefore set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_des_ecb = {
+	NID_des_ecb,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_3des_ecb = {
+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_rc4 = {
+	NID_rc4,
+	1, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_cbc = {
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_cbc = {
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_cbc = {
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV, therefore set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_ecb = {
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	16, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_ecb = {
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	16, 24, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_ecb = {
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	16, 32, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER dev_bf_cbc = {
+	NID_bf_cbc,
+	8, 16, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+
+/*
+ * NID_undef's will be changed for AES counter mode, as soon they are created.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_ctr = {
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_ctr = {
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_ctr = {
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	devcrypto_cipher_init,
+	devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher,
+	devcrypto_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+};
+
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+
+/*
+ * This function creates a new NID.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+{
+	ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+	int nid;
+
+	if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
+	    1, sn, ln)) == NULL) {
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	nid = OBJ_add_object(o); /* will return NID_undef on error */
+	ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+	return (nid);
+}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * This function creates new NIDs for AES counter mode algorithms.
+ * Note that OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we have to help
+ * ourselves here.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+{
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) /* already set */
+		return (1);
+
+	NID_aes_128_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr");
+	if (NID_aes_128_ctr == NID_undef)
+		goto failed;
+	cipher_table[DEV_AES_128_CTR].nid =
+	    dev_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+
+	NID_aes_192_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr");
+	if (NID_aes_192_ctr == NID_undef)
+		goto failed;
+	cipher_table[DEV_AES_192_CTR].nid =
+	    dev_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+
+	NID_aes_256_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr");
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr == NID_undef)
+		goto failed;
+	cipher_table[DEV_AES_256_CTR].nid =
+	    dev_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+
+	return (1);
+
+failed:
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+static void
+devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+{
+	ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL;
+
+	if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) {
+		ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr);
+		if (ob != NULL)
+			ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+	}
+
+	if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) {
+		ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr);
+		if (ob != NULL)
+			ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+	}
+
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) {
+		ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr);
+		if (ob != NULL)
+		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+	}
+}
+
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * Open the /dev/crypto device
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_open(void)
+{
+	int fd = -1;
+
+	if (kernel_fd != -1) {  /* already open */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		kernel_fd_ref++;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock);
+	fd = open(CRYPTO_DEVICE, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr,
+		    "libdevcrypto: open /dev/crypto failed, errno=%x\n",
+		    errno);
+#endif
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: failed to fcntl\n");
+#endif
+		(void) close(fd);
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	kernel_fd = fd;
+	kernel_fd_ref++;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function gets the total number of hardware providers presented in
+ * the system first.  If there is any hardware providers, then it will get
+ * the kernel provider id for each hardware slot also.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_get_slot_info(void)
+{
+	crypto_get_provider_list_t *pl = NULL;
+	int ret = 1;
+	int r;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Already have the information */
+	if (kernel_provider_id != NULL)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* Find out how many hardware slots are presented. */
+	pl = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (crypto_get_provider_list_t));
+	if (pl == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	pl->pl_count = 0;
+	while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST, pl)) < 0) {
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (r < 0 || pl->pl_return_value != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST:"
+		    "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r,  pl->pl_return_value);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	slot_count = pl->pl_count;
+	if (slot_count == 0) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: no hw providers\n");
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the provider ID for each slot from kernel and save it */
+	kernel_provider_id = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID) * slot_count);
+	if (kernel_provider_id == NULL) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	(void) OPENSSL_free(pl);
+	pl = OPENSSL_malloc(slot_count * sizeof (crypto_get_provider_list_t));
+	if (pl == NULL) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pl->pl_count = slot_count;
+	while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST, pl)) < 0) {
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (r < 0 || (pl->pl_return_value != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST:"
+		    "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r,  pl->pl_return_value);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++) {
+		kernel_provider_id[i] = pl->pl_list[i].pe_provider_id;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: i = %d, "
+		    "kernel_provider_id = %d\n", i, kernel_provider_id[i]);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (pl != NULL)
+		(void) OPENSSL_free(pl);
+
+	if (ret == 0 && kernel_provider_id != NULL) {
+		(void) OPENSSL_free(kernel_provider_id);
+		kernel_provider_id = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function checks if the "nid" is already in the nid list.
+ */
+static int
+nid_in_list(int nid, int *nid_list, int count)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (nid_list == NULL || count <= 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	while (i < count) {
+		if (nid == nid_list[i])
+			break;
+		i++;
+	}
+	return (i < count ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is to get all the ciphers supported by hardware providers.
+ * If this function is successfully completed, then the following 2 global
+ * variables will be set.
+ * cipher_count - the number of ciphers found in all hardware providers.
+ * cipher_nids - the nid list for all the ciphers.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_get_hw_ciphers(void)
+{
+	crypto_get_provider_mechanism_info_t mechinfo;
+	int max_cipher_count;
+	int *tmp_nids = NULL;
+	const char *mech_string;
+	int r;
+	int i, j;
+
+	if (slot_count <= 0)  /* no hardware provider */
+		return (0);
+
+	max_cipher_count = slot_count * DEV_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+	tmp_nids = OPENSSL_malloc(max_cipher_count * sizeof (int));
+	if (tmp_nids == NULL) {
+		/* not enough memory */
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++) {
+		mechinfo.mi_provider_id = kernel_provider_id[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < DEV_CIPHER_MAX; j++) {
+			mech_string =
+			    pkcs11_mech2str(cipher_table[j].mech_type);
+			if (mech_string == NULL) {
+				continue; /* shouldn't happen; skip it */
+			}
+
+			(void) strlcpy(mechinfo.mi_mechanism_name,
+			    mech_string, CRYPTO_MAX_MECH_NAME);
+			while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd,
+			    CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_MECHANISM_INFO,
+			    &mechinfo)) < 0) {
+				if (errno != EINTR)
+					break;
+			}
+			if (r < 0) {
+				goto failed;
+			}
+
+			if (mechinfo.mi_return_value == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+				/*
+				 * Found this mechanism in hardware providers.
+				 * If it is not in the nid list yet, add it.
+				 */
+				if (!nid_in_list(cipher_table[j].nid,
+				    tmp_nids, cipher_count)) {
+					tmp_nids[cipher_count] =
+					    cipher_table[j].nid;
+					cipher_count++;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cipher_count > 0) {
+		cipher_nids = tmp_nids;
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+
+failed:
+	if (r < 0 || cipher_count == 0) {
+		if (tmp_nids != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(tmp_nids);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_get_all_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+    const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+	if (!cipher) {
+		*nids = (cipher_count > 0) ? cipher_nids : NULL;
+		return (cipher_count);
+	}
+
+	switch (nid) {
+	case NID_des_cbc:
+	*cipher = &dev_des_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+		*cipher = &dev_3des_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_des_ecb:
+		*cipher = &dev_des_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+		*cipher = &dev_3des_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_rc4:
+		*cipher = &dev_rc4;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_128_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_192_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_256_cbc;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_128_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_192_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+		*cipher = &dev_aes_256_ecb;
+		break;
+	case NID_bf_cbc:
+		*cipher = &dev_bf_cbc;
+		break;
+	default:
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+		/*
+		 * We cannot put the NIDs for AES counter mode in separated
+		 * cases as above because they are not constants.
+		 */
+		if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
+			*cipher = &dev_aes_128_ctr;
+		else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
+			*cipher = &dev_aes_192_ctr;
+		else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+			*cipher = &dev_aes_256_ctr;
+		else
+			*cipher = NULL;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return (*cipher != NULL);
+}
+
+
+static int
+get_cipher_id_by_nid(int nid)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < DEV_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+		if (cipher_table[i].nid == nid)
+			return (cipher_table[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+get_slotid_by_mechanism(const char *mech_string, CK_SLOT_ID *slot_id)
+{
+	crypto_get_provider_mechanism_info_t mechanism_info;
+	uint_t rv;
+	int r;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	(void) strlcpy(mechanism_info.mi_mechanism_name, mech_string,
+	    CRYPTO_MAX_MECH_NAME);
+	while (i < slot_count) {
+		mechanism_info.mi_provider_id = kernel_provider_id[i];
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd,
+		    CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_MECHANISM_INFO,
+		    &mechanism_info)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (r < 0) {
+			return (0); /* ioctl function failed */
+		}
+		rv = mechanism_info.mi_return_value;
+		if (rv == 0) { /* found it */
+			*slot_id = kernel_provider_id[i];
+			return (1);
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+static int
+devcrypto_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+	crypto_encrypt_init_t encrypt_init;
+	crypto_decrypt_init_t decrypt_init;
+	crypto_open_session_t session;
+	crypto_get_mechanism_number_t get_number;
+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS aes_ctr_params;
+	devcrypto_cipher_t *the_cipher;
+	const char *mech_string;
+	CK_SLOT_ID slot_id;
+	int index;
+	int r;
+	uint_t rv = 0;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* get the cipher entry index in cipher_table from nid */
+	index = get_cipher_id_by_nid(ctx->cipher->nid);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= DEV_CIPHER_MAX) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	the_cipher = &cipher_table[index];
+
+	/* check key size */
+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < the_cipher->iv_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len < the_cipher->min_key_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len > the_cipher->max_key_len) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Set cipher flags, if any */
+	ctx->flags |= the_cipher->flags;
+
+	/* get the mechanism string */
+	mech_string = pkcs11_mech2str(the_cipher->mech_type);
+	if (mech_string == NULL) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_MECH_STRING);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: mech_string=%s\n", mech_string);
+#endif
+
+	/* Find the slot that supports this mechanism */
+	if (!get_slotid_by_mechanism(mech_string, &slot_id)) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr,
+		    "libdevcrypto: failed to find a slot with %s\n",
+		    mech_string);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: found a slot with %s, "
+	    "slot_id = %d\n", mech_string, slot_id);
+#endif
+
+	/* Open a session on this slot */
+	session.os_provider_id = slot_id;
+	session.os_flags = CKF_RW_SESSION | CKF_SERIAL_SESSION;
+	while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_OPEN_SESSION, &session)) < 0) {
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+	rv = session.os_return_value;
+	if (r || rv) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr,
+		    "libdevcrypto:cipher_init:failed to open a session\n");
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:cipher_init: open session = %d\n",
+	    session.os_session);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	/* save the session_id */
+	devc_ctx->session_id = session.os_session;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the kernel mechanism number for this mechanism, if it has not
+	 * been retrieved yet.
+	 */
+	if (the_cipher->pn_internal_number == CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID) {
+		get_number.pn_mechanism_string = (char *)mech_string;
+		get_number.pn_mechanism_len = strlen(mech_string) + 1;
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER,
+		    &get_number)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = get_number.pn_return_value;
+		if (r || rv) {
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT,
+			    DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+			(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:cipher_init: "
+			    "failed to get the kernel mech number.\n");
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+			goto failed;
+		}
+
+		the_cipher->pn_internal_number = get_number.pn_internal_number;
+	}
+
+	/* Crypto Init */
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		encrypt_init.ei_session = session.os_session;
+		encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
+		encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_obj_id = 0;
+		encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_data = (void *) key;
+		encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_length = ctx->key_len * 8;
+		encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_type = the_cipher->pn_internal_number;
+
+		if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+		    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+		    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) {
+			encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param =
+			    (void *) (&aes_ctr_params);
+			encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len =
+			    sizeof (aes_ctr_params);
+
+			aes_ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+			OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			(void) memcpy(aes_ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv,
+			    AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		} else {
+			if (the_cipher->iv_len > 0) {
+				encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param =
+				    (char *)ctx->iv;
+				encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len =
+				    ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+			} else {
+				encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param = NULL;
+				encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_INIT,
+		    &encrypt_init)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = encrypt_init.ei_return_value;
+
+	} else {
+		decrypt_init.di_session = session.os_session;
+		decrypt_init.di_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
+		decrypt_init.di_key.ck_obj_id = 0;
+		decrypt_init.di_key.ck_data = (void *) key;
+		decrypt_init.di_key.ck_length = ctx->key_len * 8;
+		decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_type = the_cipher->pn_internal_number;
+
+		if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+		    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+		    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) {
+			decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param =
+			    (void *)(&aes_ctr_params);
+			decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len =
+			    sizeof (aes_ctr_params);
+			aes_ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+			OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			(void) memcpy(aes_ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv,
+			    AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		} else {
+			if (the_cipher->iv_len > 0) {
+				decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param =
+				    (char *)ctx->iv;
+				decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len =
+				    ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+			} else {
+				decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param = NULL;
+				decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_INIT,
+		    &decrypt_init)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = decrypt_init.di_return_value;
+	}
+
+failed:
+	if (r || rv) {
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT);
+		else
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT);
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ENCRYPT_UPDATE or DECRYPT_UPDATE
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+    const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+	crypto_encrypt_update_t encrypt_update;
+	crypto_decrypt_update_t decrypt_update;
+	devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+	int r = 0, rv = 0;
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		encrypt_update.eu_session = devc_ctx->session_id;
+		encrypt_update.eu_databuf = (char *)in;
+		encrypt_update.eu_datalen = inl;
+		encrypt_update.eu_encrbuf = (char *)out;
+		encrypt_update.eu_encrlen = inl;
+
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_UPDATE,
+		    &encrypt_update)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = encrypt_update.eu_return_value;
+
+	} else { /* decrypt */
+		decrypt_update.du_session = devc_ctx->session_id;
+		decrypt_update.du_encrbuf = (char *)in;
+		decrypt_update.du_encrlen = inl;
+		decrypt_update.du_databuf = (char *)out;
+		decrypt_update.du_datalen = inl;
+
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_UPDATE,
+		    &decrypt_update)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = decrypt_update.du_return_value;
+	}
+
+	if (r || rv) {
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE);
+		else
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:crypto_do ret (r) = 0x%x,"
+		    "crypto ret (rv) = 0x%x,", r, rv);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ENCRYPT_FINAL or DECRYPT_FINAL
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	crypto_encrypt_final_t encrypt_final;
+	crypto_decrypt_final_t decrypt_final;
+	crypto_close_session_t session;
+	devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+	char buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	int r;
+	uint_t rv = 0;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		encrypt_final.ef_session = devc_ctx->session_id;
+		encrypt_final.ef_encrbuf = buf;
+		encrypt_final.ef_encrlen = sizeof (buf);
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL,
+		    &encrypt_final)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = encrypt_final.ef_return_value;
+
+	} else {
+		decrypt_final.df_session = devc_ctx->session_id;
+		decrypt_final.df_databuf = buf;
+		decrypt_final.df_datalen = sizeof (buf);
+		while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL,
+		    &decrypt_final)) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+		rv = decrypt_final.df_return_value;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL "
+		    "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, rv);
+	else
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL "
+		    "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, rv);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	if (r || rv) {
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP,
+			    DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL);
+		else
+			DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP,
+			    DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* close the session */
+	session.cs_session = devc_ctx->session_id;
+	while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION, &session)) < 0) {
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION, "
+	    "session id = %d ret (r) = 0x%x, crypto ret (rv) = 0x%x\n",
+	    devc_ctx->session_id, r, rv);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	if (r || rv) {
+		DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+devcrypto_cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (kernel_fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock);
+	kernel_fd_ref--;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+
+	if (kernel_fd_ref == 0) {
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		(void) close(kernel_fd);
+		kernel_fd = -1;
+		if (kernel_provider_id != NULL) {
+			OPENSSL_free(kernel_provider_id);
+			kernel_provider_id = NULL;
+		}
+		if (cipher_nids != NULL) {
+			OPENSSL_free(cipher_nids);
+			cipher_nids = NULL;
+		}
+		devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs();
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock);
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(kernel_fd_lock);
+		OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock);
+		kernel_fd_lock = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+devcrypto_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings();
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+devcrypto_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	devcrypto_cleanup();
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the engine info and get the /dev/crypto engine ready.
+ */
+static int
+devcrypto_bind(ENGINE *e)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	int i;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/* Get the NIDs for AES counter mode algorithms first. */
+	if (devcrypto_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) {
+		return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+	/* Create a lock for the devcrypto device file descriptor */
+	if (kernel_fd_lock == NULL) {
+		kernel_fd_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (kernel_fd_lock == NULL) {
+			devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs();
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+		if (pthread_mutex_init(kernel_fd_lock, NULL) != 0) {
+			devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs();
+			OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock);
+			kernel_fd_lock = NULL;
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Open the /dev/crypto device */
+	if (devcrypto_open() == 0) {
+		devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs();
+		pthread_mutex_destroy(kernel_fd_lock);
+		OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock);
+		kernel_fd_lock = NULL;
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Get all hardware providers' information */
+	if (devcrypto_get_slot_info() == 0) {
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (devcrypto_get_hw_ciphers() == 0) {
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	(void) fprintf(stderr, "cipher_count = %d\n", cipher_count);
+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_count; i++) {
+		(void) fprintf(stderr,
+		    "cipher_nids[i] = %d\n", cipher_nids[i]);
+	}
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_NAME) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, devcrypto_get_all_ciphers) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, devcrypto_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, devcrypto_finish)) {
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up the devcrypto error handling */
+	ERR_load_devcrypto_strings();
+	return (1);
+
+failed:
+	devcrypto_cleanup();
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+static int
+bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+	if (id != NULL && (strcmp(id, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID) != 0)) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto - bad engine id\n");
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (!devcrypto_bind(e)) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		(void) fprintf(stderr,
+		    "libdevcrypto - failed to bind engine\n");
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91c724d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include "e_devcrypto_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+#define	ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0, func, 0)
+#define	ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0, 0, reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA devcrypto_str_functs[]=
+{
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_INIT),		"DEVCRYPTO_INIT"},
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_DESTROY),		"DEVCRYPTO_DESTROY"},
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_FINISH),		"DEVCRYPTO_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT),		"DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_INIT"},
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER),	"DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
+{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP),	"DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA devcrypto_str_reasons[]=
+{
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY), "invalid cipher key"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID), "invalid cipher nid"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM), "IV or key length incorrect"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_MECH_STRING), "convert cipher type to string failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH),
+	"no hardware providers support this cipher"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION), "CRYPTO_OPEN_SESSION failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER),
+	"CRYPTO_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT),  	"CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_INIT failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE),  	"CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_UPDATE failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL),  	"CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT),  	"CRYPTO_DECRYPT_INIT failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE),  	"CRYPTO_DECRYPT_UPDATE failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL),  	"CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL failed"},
+{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION),  	"CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION failed"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
+
+#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA DEVCRYPTO_lib_name[]=
+{
+{0, DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME},
+{0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static int devcrypto_error_code = 0;
+static int devcrypto_error_init = 1;
+
+static void
+ERR_load_devcrypto_strings(void)
+{
+	if (devcrypto_error_code == 0)
+		devcrypto_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+	if (devcrypto_error_init) {
+		devcrypto_error_init = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_load_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_functs);
+		ERR_load_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME
+		DEVCRYPTO_lib_name->error =
+		    ERR_PACK(devcrypto_error_code, 0, 0);
+		ERR_load_strings(0, DEVCRYPTO_lib_name);
+#endif
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings(void)
+{
+	if (devcrypto_error_init == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_unload_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_functs);
+		ERR_unload_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME
+		ERR_unload_strings(0, DEVCRYPTO_lib_name);
+#endif
+		devcrypto_error_init = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ERR_devcrypto_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+	if (devcrypto_error_code == 0)
+		devcrypto_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+	ERR_PUT_error(devcrypto_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.h b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40a2cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H
+#define	HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H
+
+static void ERR_load_devcrypto_strings(void);
+static void ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings(void);
+static void ERR_devcrypto_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+
+#define	DEVCRYPTOerr(f, r) ERR_devcrypto_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+
+/* Function codes */
+#define	DEVC_F_INIT 				100
+#define	DEVC_F_DESTROY 				101
+#define	DEVC_F_FINISH				102
+#define	DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT			103
+#define	DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			104
+#define	DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			105
+
+
+/* Reason codes */
+#define	DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY			100
+#define	DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID			101
+#define	DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		102
+#define	DEVC_R_MECH_STRING			103
+#define	DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH		104
+#define	DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION			105
+#define	DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER		106
+#define	DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT			107
+#define	DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE			108
+#define	DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL			109
+#define	DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT			110
+#define	DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE			111
+#define	DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL			112
+#define	DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION			113
+
+#endif /* HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f35714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3924 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
+#define	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
+#endif
+
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+
+#define	PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
+ * initialization.
+ */
+int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock = NULL;
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
+ */
+int *hw_cnids;
+int *hw_dnids;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+enum pk11_cipher_id {
+	PK11_DES_CBC,
+	PK11_DES3_CBC,
+	PK11_DES_ECB,
+	PK11_DES3_ECB,
+	PK11_RC4,
+	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
+	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
+};
+
+/* Index for the supported digests */
+enum pk11_digest_id {
+	PK11_MD5,
+	PK11_SHA1,
+	PK11_SHA224,
+	PK11_SHA256,
+	PK11_SHA384,
+	PK11_SHA512,
+	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
+};
+
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	int			iv_len;
+	int			min_key_len;
+	int			max_key_len;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_CIPHER;
+
+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_DIGEST;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len);
+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+	size_t count);
+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+    int *local_cipher_nids);
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
+    int *local_digest_nids);
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+    PK11_DIGEST *digest);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
+static int hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type)	\
+	{								\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
+		{							\
+		retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
+		    sp->persistent);					\
+		}							\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	}
+
+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+static int cipher_count		= 0;
+static int digest_count		= 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Static list of ciphers.
+ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
+ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
+ */
+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+	{
+	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
+		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
+		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Static list of digests.
+ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
+ * thus digests[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
+ */
+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
+	{
+	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
+	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
+	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
+	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
+	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
+	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
+	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
+	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ *
+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
+ */
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_cbc,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ecb,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	16, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	16, 24, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	16, 32, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_bf_cbc,
+	8, 16, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+	{
+	NID_rc4,
+	1, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
+	{
+	NID_md5,
+	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	MD5_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
+	{
+	NID_sha1,
+	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+	{
+	NID_sha224,
+	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
+	{
+	NID_sha256,
+	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
+	{
+	NID_sha384,
+	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
+	{
+	NID_sha512,
+	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define	PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+	{
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+		"SO_PATH",
+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+	{
+	pk11_rand_seed,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
+	pk11_rand_add,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_status
+	};
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+static ENGINE* pk11_engine = NULL;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		session_cache[type].lock =
+		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+			goto malloc_err;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	/* Free uri_lock */
+	(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(uri_lock);
+	OPENSSL_free(uri_lock);
+	uri_lock = NULL;
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
+	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+			return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, pk11_engine_pkey_methods))
+		return (0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	if (pk11_have_random)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+		return (0);
+
+/*
+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
+	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
+#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+	{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!ret)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
+		{
+		ENGINE_free(ret);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+int
+pk11_engine_loaded()
+	{
+	ENGINE *e;
+	int rtrn = 0;
+
+	if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_pk11_id)) != NULL)
+		{
+		rtrn = 1;
+		ENGINE_free(e);
+		}
+	return (rtrn);
+	}
+
+void
+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not attempt to load the engine twice!
+	 * Multiple instances would share static variables from this file.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_engine_loaded())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
+	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
+	 */
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
+	if (!e_pk11)
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
+	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
+	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
+	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
+	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	}
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+	}
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+	}
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return (pk11_library_init(e));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function that unsets reference to current engine (pk11_engine = NULL).
+ *
+ * Use of local variable only seems clumsy, it needs to be this way!
+ * This is to prevent double free in the unlucky scenario:
+ *     ENGINE_free calls pk11_destroy calls pk11_finish calls ENGINE_free
+ * Setting pk11_engine to NULL prior to ENGINE_free() avoids this.
+ */
+static void pk11_engine_free()
+	{
+	ENGINE* old_engine = pk11_engine;
+
+	if (old_engine) {
+		pk11_engine = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(old_engine);
+	}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_INFO info;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+	int any_slot_found;
+	int i;
+
+	if (e != pk11_engine)
+		{
+		pk11_engine_free();
+		pk11_engine = e;
+		ENGINE_up_ref(e);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
+	 * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
+	 * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
+	 * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
+	 * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
+	 * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
+	 * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
+	 * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
+	 * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+			{
+			return (1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			/*
+			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+			 * engine first.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_all_locks();
+			}
+		}
+
+
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		{
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+		if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/*
+	 * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
+	 * NIDs there.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+	if (!p)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+	 * because no slot was present.
+	 */
+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
+	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
+	 */
+	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
+			== CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
+		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
+		digest_count = 0;
+	}
+
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+	pk11_pid = getpid();
+	/*
+	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+	 * will do the cleanup.
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+		goto err;
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int rtn = 1;
+
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+	if (pk11_library_initialized == CK_TRUE)
+		rtn = pk11_finish(e);
+
+	return (rtn);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure, right engine instance is being destroyed.
+	 * Engine e may be the wrong instance if
+	 * 	1) either someone calls ENGINE_load_pk11 twice
+	 * 	2) or last ref. to an already finished engine is being destroyed
+	 */
+	if (e != pk11_engine)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* free all active lists */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects.
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	{
+		ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL;
+		if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+		if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+		if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pk11_dso = NULL;
+	pFuncList = NULL;
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+	pk11_pid = 0;
+	pk11_engine_free();
+	/*
+	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+	 * the engine before calling fork().
+	 */
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+	{
+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		if (initialized)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+	default:
+		break;
+		}
+
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
+	 */
+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+	{
+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	static pid_t pid = 0;
+	pid_t new_pid;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+	 * here, with no PID information.
+	 */
+	if (pid == 0)
+		pid = getpid();
+
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp = freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+	 * structure from the freelist.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+		/*
+		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+		 * mark them as unused.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	else
+		freelist = sp->next;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+	 */
+	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+		{
+		pid = new_pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+		 * head of the list).
+		 */
+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+			{
+			freelist = sp1->next;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+			}
+
+		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
+		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+		/* Initialize the process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+		 * information.
+		 */
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+			goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+		 * re-initialization.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+			 * the caller cope with the situation.
+			 */
+			freelist = sp;
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->pid == 0)
+		{
+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+	if (sp != NULL)
+		sp->next = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+
+	return (sp);
+	}
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+		return;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return;
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp->next = freelist;
+	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	}
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+	 * return 0 on exit.
+	 */
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+		{
+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+				ret = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_RAND:
+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			myslot = SLOTID;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
+		 * reinitialize of the session
+		 */
+		pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+			return (0);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+		}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->pid = getpid();
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+	 */
+	sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
+ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
+ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
+ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
+ */
+static void
+destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DH);
+		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
+ *
+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
+ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+err:
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+	 */
+	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+		return (1);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
+static int
+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
+			return (ciphers[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (cipher_count > 0)
+		*nids = cipher_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (cipher_count);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (digest_count > 0)
+		*nids = digest_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (digest_count);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
+	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+	/*
+	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
+	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
+	 * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+		{
+		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
+		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
+		/*
+		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
+		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
+		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
+		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
+		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
+		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
+		 */
+		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+		{
+		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+			{
+			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
+			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+	else
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
+		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
+	/*
+	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
+	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
+	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
+	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
+	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
+	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
+	 * code serves as a sanity check.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
+	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
+	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
+	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
+	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
+	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
+	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
+	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
+	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		state->sp = sp;
+		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+			return (0);
+
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
+	 * needs to be created.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
+			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
+		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+			{
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
+	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
+ * that it needs not be recreated.
+ *
+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long outl = inl;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
+	if (!inl)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
+	 * the same size of input.
+	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
+	 * correctly aligned buffers.
+	 */
+	if (inl != outl)
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
+		 * rid of the context.
+		 */
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+		else
+			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!cipher)
+		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_bf_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_rc4:
+			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+			break;
+		default:
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+			/*
+			 * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
+			 * here are not constants.
+			 */
+			if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
+			else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+			*cipher = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*cipher != NULL);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!digest)
+		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			*digest = &pk11_md5;
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * A special case. For "openssl dgst -dss1 -engine pkcs11 ...",
+		 * OpenSSL calls EVP_get_digestbyname() on "dss1" which ends up
+		 * calling pk11_engine_digests() for NID_dsa. Internally, if an
+		 * engine is not used, OpenSSL uses SHA1_Init() as expected for
+		 * DSA. So, we must return pk11_sha1() for NID_dsa as well. Note
+		 * that this must have changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 since we
+		 * did not have the problem with the 0.9.8 version.
+		 */
+		case NID_sha1:
+		case NID_dsa:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha224:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha384:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*digest = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*digest != NULL);
+	}
+
+
+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
+	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
+	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
+	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
+	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
+	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
+	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
+	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
+	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
+	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
+	 * terminate the active operation.
+	 */
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the key information used in this session.
+	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
+	 */
+	sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
+		PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
+	(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+err:
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+static int
+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
+		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+			return (digests[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	pdp = &digests[index];
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
+	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
+	if (count == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
+		count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long len;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
+		return (0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
+	 * to the pool
+	 */
+	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
+	if (from->md_data == NULL || to->digest->ctx_size == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* The copy-from state */
+	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
+	if (state->sp == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
+	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
+		goto err;
+	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
+	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (ul_state_len == 0)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
+	if (pstate == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
+		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
+		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (pstate != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
+static int
+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
+	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
+		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
+		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
+		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
+		 * will return the session to the cache.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
+ * prefix.
+ */
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
+	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+		{
+		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * The secret key object is created in the
+			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
+			 */
+			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
+				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKM_DSA
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
+ * CKM_DES_CBC
+ * CKM_AES_CBC
+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
+ * CKM_DES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_CTR
+ * CKM_RC4
+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
+ *
+ * Digests optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_MD5
+ * CKM_SHA_1
+ * CKM_SHA224
+ * CKM_SHA256
+ * CKM_SHA384
+ * CKM_SHA512
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+	{
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int slot_n_digest = 0;
+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
+	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 0;
+
+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+			&mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
+			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
+			 */
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+			    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
+
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
+				{
+				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
+			&mech_info);
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
+			}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
+		 * derivation.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+		    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
+				{
+				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
+		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
+			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+			/*
+			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
+			 * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
+			 */
+			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+			    PK11_DBG);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			    best_slot_sofar);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
+			}
+		} /* for */
+
+	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+		}
+
+	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+		(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+		(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
+		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_cipher);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_digest);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n",
+			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
+		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
+		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
+		 */
+		if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
+		    (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
+				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
+			cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
+			digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
+			(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+			(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
+
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 1;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+		{
+		if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
+		    mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
+			    " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
+			    cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
+			    mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
+			return;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
+			    cipher->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
+		{
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
+			    digest->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+	{
+	ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+	int nid;
+
+	if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
+	    1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
+		{
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* will return NID_undef on error */
+	nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
+	ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+
+	return (nid);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
+ * have to help ourselves here.
+ */
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+	{
+	/* are we already set? */
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
+	 * follow the format of those that exist.
+	 */
+	if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
+		    current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
+		    local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
+ *
+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
+ * asymmetric operations.
+ *
+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
+ *
+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
+ * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
+ * the code won't be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#else
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
+ */
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	void *handle;
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
+	int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+	/*
+	 * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own
+	 * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions
+	 * from the top-level PKCS#11 library.
+	 */
+	if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
+	    PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+		    PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		/* this means empty tables */
+		hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also
+	 * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
+	 * search.
+	 */
+	hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+	hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
+	tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
+	tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
+	 * is zero now.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
+		 * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+		 */
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
+		pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
+	 * dlclose(3C).
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+	OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	(void) dlclose(handle);
+	hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
+	hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
+	if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs unless the mechanism is
+ * supported directly in a CPU instruction set. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
+ * non-existent).
+ */
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+	{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Special case first. NULL means that we are initializing a new table.
+	 */
+	if (nid_table == NULL)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have an AES instruction set on SPARC we route everything
+	 * through the Crypto Framework (ie., through pkcs11_softtoken in this
+	 * case). This is for T4 which has HW instructions for AES, DES, MD5,
+	 * SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, MONTMUL, and MPMUL.
+	 *
+	 * On Intel, if we have AES-NI instruction set we route AES to the
+	 * Crypto Framework. Intel CPUs do not have other instruction sets for
+	 * HW crypto acceleration so we check the HW NID table for any other
+	 * mechanism.
+	 */
+#if defined(__x86)
+	if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1)
+		{
+		switch (nid)
+			{
+			case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+				return (1);
+			}
+		/*
+		 * These are variables, cannot be used as case expressions.
+		 */
+		if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+		    nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+		    nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+			{
+				return (1);
+			}
+		}
+#elif defined(__sparc)
+	if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1)
+		return (1);
+#endif
+
+	/* The table is never full, there is always at least one NID_undef. */
+	while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+		{
+		if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
+			return (1);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Do we have an AES instruction set? */
+static int
+hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void)
+	{
+	static int present = -1;
+
+	if (present == -1)
+		{
+		uint_t ui = 0;
+
+		(void) getisax(&ui, 1);
+
+#if defined(__amd64) || defined(__i386)
+		present = (ui & AV_386_AES) > 0;
+#elif defined(__sparc)
+		present = (ui & (AV_SPARC_AES|AV_SPARC_FJAES)) > 0;
+#endif
+		}
+
+	return (present);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..547a104
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.h */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef	HW_PK11_H
+#define	HW_PK11_H
+
+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* max byte length of a symmetric key we support */
+#define	PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX			32
+
+/*
+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
+ *
+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
+	{
+	struct PK11_st_SESSION	*next;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;	/* PK11 session handle */
+	pid_t			pid;		/* Current process ID */
+	CK_BBOOL		persistent;	/* is that a keystore object? */
+	union
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			RSA			*rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
+			RSA			*rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
+			} u_RSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			DSA			*dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
+			DSA			*dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
+			} u_DSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dh_key; /* key handle */
+			DH			*dh; /* dh key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
+			} u_DH;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	cipher_key; /* key handle */
+			unsigned char		key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
+			int			key_len; /* priv key len */
+			int			encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
+			} u_cipher;
+		} opdata_u;
+	} PK11_SESSION;
+
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
+#define	opdata_rsa_n_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_e_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_d_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
+#define	opdata_dh_key		opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
+#define	opdata_dh		opdata_u.u_DH.dh
+#define	opdata_dh_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
+#define	opdata_cipher_key	opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
+#define	opdata_key		opdata_u.u_cipher.key
+#define	opdata_key_len		opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
+#define	opdata_encrypt		opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
+
+/*
+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
+ *   1) asymmetric operations
+ *   2) random operations
+ *   3) symmetric and digest operations
+ *
+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
+ * only a single group of operations.
+ *
+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
+ *
+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
+ * further split into types with each type having a separate session cache.
+ */
+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
+	{
+	OP_RAND,
+	OP_RSA,
+	OP_DSA,
+	OP_DH,
+	OP_CIPHER,
+	OP_DIGEST,
+	OP_MAX
+	} PK11_OPTYPE;
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
+ * and locks associated with the lists.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *head;
+	pthread_mutex_t *lock;
+	} PK11_CACHE;
+
+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
+typedef struct PK11_active_st
+	{
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
+	unsigned int refcnt;
+	struct PK11_active_st *prev;
+	struct PK11_active_st *next;
+	} PK11_active;
+
+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
+/*
+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
+ */
+extern char *passphrasedialog;
+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
+#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
+
+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+extern int pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth,
+    const int **nids, int nid);
+
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* HW_PK11_H */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b6d358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
+{
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0),			"PK11_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0),		"PK11_DESTROY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0),			"PK11_CTRL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_RSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0),		"PK11_RAND_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0),		"PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_GET_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DH_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DH_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0),		"PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0),		"PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0),	"PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0),		"PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0),		"PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0),			"ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0),	"PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0),	"PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0),	"PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0),	"PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0),		"PK11_GET_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0),		"PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0),	"PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0),		"PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
+{
+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED,		"PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE,			"unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED,			"PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER,		"null parameter passed"},
+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE,			"C_Initialize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE,			"C_Finalize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GETINFO,			"C_GetInfo faile"},
+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST,			"C_GetSlotList failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT,	"no modulus or no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID,	"attr sensitive or invalid"},
+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,		"C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS,			"no modulus"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT,			"no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,		"C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,			"C_FindObjects failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,		"C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,			"C_CreateObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,			"C_DestroyObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION,			"C_OpenSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION,			"C_CloseSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT,			"C_EncryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT,			"C_Encrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT,			"C_SignInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGN,				"C_Sign failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT,			"C_DecryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT,			"C_Decrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFY,			"C_Verify failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT,		"C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY,			"C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM,			"C_SeedRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM,		"C_GenerateRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH,	"invalid message length"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE,	"unknown algorithm type"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,	"unknown asn1 onject id"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE,		"unknown padding type"},
+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED,		"padding check failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG,		"digest too big"},
+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE,		"malloc failure"},
+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"ctl command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN,	"data is bigger than mod"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS,	"data is too larger for mod"},
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT,		"a dsa component is missing"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,	"invalid signature length"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R,	"missing r in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S,	"missing s in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY,		"inconsistent key type"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE,			"C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE,			"C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT,			"C_DigestInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE,			"C_DigestUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL,			"C_DigestFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL,			"C_EncryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL,			"C_DecryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT,		"Slot does not support PRNG"},
+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO,			"C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY,			"C_DeriveKey failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_GetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_SetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE,		"invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM,		"IV or key length incorrect"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE,	"invalid operation type"},
+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED,		"failed to add NID" },
+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED,			"atfork failed" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED,		"C_Login failed on token" },
+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND,	"more than one object found" },
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI,		"pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN,		"could not read PIN from terminal" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND,	"PIN not read from external command" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND,	"could not popen dialog command" },
+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED,			"pipe failed" },
+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC,		"bad passphrasedialog specification" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED,		"token not initialized" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET,		"token PIN required but not set" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED,	"token PIN required but not provided" },
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL,		"missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH,	"token attrs provided do not match" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND,		"private key not found in keystore" },
+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND,		"specified object not found" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID,	"PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED,		"sysconf failed" },
+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED,			"mmap failed" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING,	"PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED,			"mlock failed" },
+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED,			"fork failed" },
+{ 0,	NULL}
+};
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] =
+{
+{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME},
+{0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static void
+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+	if (pk11_error_init)
+		{
+		pk11_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+		pk11_engine_lib_name->error =
+		    ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+		ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+		}
+}
+
+static void
+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_error_init == 0)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+		ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+
+		pk11_error_init = 1;
+		}
+}
+
+void
+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+	ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
+
+void
+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
+{
+	char tmp_buf[20];
+
+	PK11err(function, reason);
+	(void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
+	ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
+}
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5ab40a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef	HW_PK11_ERR_H
+#define	HW_PK11_ERR_H
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
+#define	PK11err(f, r)	ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+
+#define	PK11_F_INIT 				100
+#define	PK11_F_FINISH				101
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY 				102
+#define	PK11_F_CTRL 				103
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_INIT 			104
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 			105
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 			106
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 		107
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 			108
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 			109
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 			110
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 			111
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 			112
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 			113
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 			114
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_ADD 			115
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 			116
+#define	PK11_F_GET_SESSION 			117
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 			118
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 			119
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 			120
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 			121
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 		122
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 			123
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 		124
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_SIGN				125
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY			126
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_INIT				127
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_FINISH			128
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY			129
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 		130
+#define	PK11_F_DH_INIT 				131
+#define	PK11_F_DH_FINISH 			132
+#define	PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 			133
+#define	PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 			134
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS		135
+#define	PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION			136
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT			137
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT			138
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			139
+#define	PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY			140
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT			141
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE			142
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL			143
+#define	PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT			144
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL			145
+#define	PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 			146
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD 				147
+#define	PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY			148
+#define	PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 			149
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 			150
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			151
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD			152
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE			153
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS		154
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC			155
+#define	PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS			156
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS			157
+#define	PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION			158
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PIN				159
+#define	PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 			160
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 		161
+#define	PK11_F_CACHE_PIN			162
+#define	PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY		163
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 			164
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 			165
+#define	PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 			166
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+#define	PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 			100
+#define	PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 			101
+#define	PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 			102
+#define	PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 		103
+#define	PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 		104
+#define	PK11_R_INITIALIZE 			105
+#define	PK11_R_FINALIZE 			106
+#define	PK11_R_GETINFO 				107
+#define	PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 			108
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 	109
+#define	PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 	110
+#define	PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 		111
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 			112
+#define	PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 			113
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 			114
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 			115
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 		116
+#define	PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 			118
+#define	PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 			119
+#define	PK11_R_OPENSESSION 			120
+#define	PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 			121
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 			122
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPT 				123
+#define	PK11_R_SIGNINIT 			124
+#define	PK11_R_SIGN 				125
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 			126
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPT 				127
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 			128
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFY 				129
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 		130
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 			131
+#define	PK11_R_GEN_KEY 				132
+#define	PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 			133
+#define	PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 			134
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 		135
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 		136
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 		137
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 		138
+#define	PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 		139
+#define	PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 			140
+#define	PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 			141
+#define	PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 	142
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 	143
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 	144
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT		145
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH		146
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R		147
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S		148
+#define	PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY			149
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE			150
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE			151
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTINIT			152
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE			153
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL			154
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL			155
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL			156
+#define	PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT			157
+#define	PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO			158
+#define	PK11_R_DERIVEKEY			159
+#define	PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE		160
+#define	PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE		161
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE			162
+#define	PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		163
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE		164
+#define	PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED			165
+#define	PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED			166
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED		167
+#define	PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND	168
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI		169
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN		170
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND		171
+#define	PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED			172
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND	173
+#define	PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC		174
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED		175
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET		176
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED		177
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL		178
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH		179
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND		180
+#define	PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND			181
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID	182
+#define	PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING	184
+#define	PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED			185
+#define	PK11_R_FORK_FAILED			186
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f6b328
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3277 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+
+/*
+ * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
+ * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
+ */
+char *passphrasedialog;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DSA stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+	DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+	DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DH stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
+#endif
+
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
+static int pk11_pkey_meth_nids[] = {NID_dsa};
+
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
+ * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
+ * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
+ * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
+ * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
+ * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
+ * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
+ * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
+ */
+#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
+	{								\
+	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
+		{							\
+		var = CK_TRUE;						\
+		if (unlock)						\
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
+		goto label;						\
+		}							\
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+		if (entry->h == h)
+			return (entry);
+
+	return (NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	/* search for entry in the active list */
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+		entry->refcnt++;
+	else
+		{
+		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+		if (entry == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		entry->h = h;
+		entry->refcnt = 1;
+		entry->prev = NULL;
+		entry->next = NULL;
+		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+		else /* make the entry first in the list */
+			{
+			entry->next = active_list[type];
+			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (entry->refcnt);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
+	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+		{
+		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		active_list[type] = entry->next;
+		/* we were the first but not the only one */
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* sanitization */
+	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	entry->prev = NULL;
+	entry->next = NULL;
+	OPENSSL_free(entry);
+	}
+
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+	switch (type)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			break;
+		default:
+			return;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+	entry->refcnt--;
+	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 RSA method",
+	pk11_RSA_public_encrypt,		/* rsa_pub_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_public_decrypt,		/* rsa_pub_decrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_encrypt,		/* rsa_priv_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_decrypt,		/* rsa_priv_decrypt */
+	NULL,					/* rsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL,					/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_RSA_init,				/* init */
+	pk11_RSA_finish,			/* finish */
+	RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER,			/* flags */
+	NULL,					/* app_data */
+	pk11_RSA_sign,				/* rsa_sign */
+	pk11_RSA_verify,			/* rsa_verify */
+	/* Internal rsa_keygen will be used if this is NULL. */
+	NULL					/* rsa_keygen */
+	};
+
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_rsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DSA method",
+	pk11_dsa_do_sign, 	/* dsa_do_sign */
+	NULL, 			/* dsa_sign_setup */
+	pk11_dsa_do_verify, 	/* dsa_do_verify */
+	NULL,			/* dsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL, 			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DSA_init, 		/* init */
+	pk11_DSA_finish, 	/* finish */
+	0, 			/* flags */
+	NULL 			/* app_data */
+	};
+
+DSA_METHOD *
+PK11_DSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
+ * enough.
+ */
+#define	DH_BUF_RESERVE	8
+
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DH method",
+	pk11_DH_generate_key,	/* generate_key */
+	pk11_DH_compute_key,	/* compute_key */
+	NULL,			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DH_init,		/* init */
+	pk11_DH_finish,		/* finish */
+	0,			/* flags */
+	NULL,			/* app_data */
+	NULL			/* generate_params */
+	};
+
+DH_METHOD *
+PK11_DH(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
+
+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
+#define	DSA_DATA_LEN		20
+#define	DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN	40
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Similar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
+ * should be caught in the padding functions
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* make data into a big number */
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
+	 */
+	for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
+		if (buf[j] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + j;
+	j = r - j;  /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's here
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + i;
+	i = r - i;  /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_encrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
+			    rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		retval = ul_sig_len;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
+			p_mech, h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
+	 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
+	 */
+	rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
+	 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
+	/* Encode the digest */
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		ulsiglen = j;
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+		*siglen = ulsiglen;
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Encode the digest	*/
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
+			(CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+#define	MAXATTR	1024
+/*
+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *privkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	const char *file;
+	int ret;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* We look for private keys only. */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+	 * never ask for private components.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
+	 * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
+	 * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
+	 */
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
+		 * is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
+		 * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
+		 * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
+		 * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
+		 * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
+		 * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
+		 * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
+		 * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+		/*
+		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
+		 * care of handle management ourselves.
+		 */
+		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		/*
+		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+		 * in the keystore.
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(privkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
+					    rsa);
+
+					h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+					    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						goto err;
+					}
+				else
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *pubkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
+	int ret;
+	const char *file;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+		/*
+		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+		/*
+		 * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+		 */
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(pubkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					/*
+					 * This will always destroy the RSA
+					 * object since we have a new RSA
+					 * structure here.
+					 */
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
+					    rsa);
+
+					h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+					    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						{
+						EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+						pkey = NULL;
+						}
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+					pkey = NULL;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
+ * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
+ * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
+ * session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
+ *
+ * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
+ * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	int i;
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
+
+	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
+ * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
+ * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
+ * NULL here.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	/*
+	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
+	 * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
+	 * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d == NULL)
+		{
+		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+		/*
+		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+		 * session keys.
+		 */
+		a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
+		 * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
+		 * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
+		 * types we just create a new session key using the private
+		 * components from the RSA structure.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
+	 * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
+	 * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
+	 * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
+	 * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
+	 * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
+	 * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d != NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 *
+	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+	 * both data signing and verifying.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing private key
+			 * object. We can just create a public object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
+	 * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
+	 * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
+	 * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
+	 * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
+	 * about why we compare the handle as well.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing public key
+			 * object. We can just create a private object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* The DSA function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+static DSA_SIG *
+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+	int i;
+	DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
+	 * each is 20 bytes long
+	 */
+	unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+			(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
+			rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			    (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
+			    (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+
+	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	dsa_sig->r = r;
+	dsa_sig->s = s;
+
+ret:
+	if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+		{
+		if (r != NULL)
+			BN_free(r);
+		if (s != NULL)
+			BN_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (dsa_sig);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
+	DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int retval = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+
+	unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
+		 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
+		 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
+		 */
+		(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
+		    BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+	retval = 1;
+ret:
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* pub_key - y */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* priv_key - x */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* The DH function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Generate DH key-pair.
+ *
+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG i;
+	CK_RV rv, rv1;
+	int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
+		 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
+		 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
+		 */
+		pub_key_template[1].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		pub_key_template[2].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
+	 *	 a session handle. The objects created in this function are
+	 *	 destroyed before return and thus not cached.
+	 */
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    pub_key_template,
+	    ul_pub_key_attr_count,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_pub_key,
+	    &h_priv_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
+	 * should be sufficient for reuse.
+	 */
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+	rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
+		((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
+			pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+		{
+		if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
+			pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+	DH *dh)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = -1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+	mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
+	if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+
+	(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+
+	h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
+			pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
+			    &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    h_key,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_derived_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+	    priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue =
+		OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
+	if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
+	 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+	 */
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
+		 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
+		 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
+		 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
+		 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
+		 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
+		 * pre-master secret.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
+			{
+			if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
+				break;
+			}
+
+		(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
+		ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
+		}
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
+		priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (mechanism.pParameter)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
+		mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
+	DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	key_template[0].pValue = &class;
+	key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+	key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+
+	key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
+
+	key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
+	key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dh;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
+			key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ *
+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
+ *       to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+ */
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
+	 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
+	 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Local function to simplify key template population
+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG len;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
+	 * check that here than individually in the callers.
+	 */
+	if (bn != NULL)
+		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	*ul_value_len = len;
+	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+	if (*p_value == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+	{
+		if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+			*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
+ * if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 OK
+ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
+ */
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG objcnt;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (objcnt > 1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if (objcnt == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL 1.0.0 introduced ENGINE API for the PKEY EVP functions. Sadly,
+ * "openssl dgst -dss1 ..." now uses a new function EVP_DigestSignInit() which
+ * internally needs a PKEY method for DSA even when in the engine. So, to avoid
+ * a regression when moving from 0.9.8 to 1.0.0, we use an internal OpenSSL
+ * structure for the DSA PKEY methods to make it work. It is a future project to
+ * make it work with HW acceleration.
+ *
+ * Note that at the time of 1.0.0d release there is no documentation as to how
+ * the PKEY EVP functions are to be implemented in an engine. There is only one
+ * engine shipped with 1.0.0d that uses the PKEY EVP methods, the GOST engine.
+ * It was used as an example when fixing the above mentioned regression problem.
+ */
+int
+pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids,
+    int nid)
+	{
+	if (pmeth == NULL)
+		{
+		*nids = pk11_pkey_meth_nids;
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_dsa:
+			*pmeth = (EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)EVP_PKEY_meth_find(nid);
+			return (1);
+		}
+
+	/* Error branch. */
+	*pmeth = NULL;
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faec39c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c
@@ -0,0 +1,869 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+
+/*
+ * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
+ * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
+ * processing.
+ */
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+/*
+ * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
+ * cache the PIN by default.
+ */
+static char *token_pin;
+
+static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
+static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
+
+/*
+ * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
+ * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
+ * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
+ * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
+ * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
+ * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
+ *
+ * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
+ * the fork.
+ *
+ * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
+ * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
+ *	1 if we got the PIN
+ */
+#define	EXEC_SPEC	"exec:"
+#define	BUILTIN_SPEC	"builtin"
+int
+pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
+	{
+	/* Initialize as an error. */
+	*pin = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
+		{
+		/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		/* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
+		*pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
+		if (*pin == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			char *pw;
+
+			/*
+			 * getpassphrase() uses an internal  buffer to hold the
+			 * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
+			 * with '\0'.
+			 */
+			if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			/* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
+			memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
+			*pin = pw;
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/*
+		 * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
+		 * of an external command.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
+			{
+			dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
+			if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
+			 * keyword.
+			 */
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
+ * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
+ * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
+ * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
+ * 	1 if all is OK
+ *	2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
+ *	pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
+ *	inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
+ */
+int
+pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+	const char **file)
+	{
+	char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
+
+	/* Check the "file://" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
+		{
+		*file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
+		return (2);
+		}
+
+	/*  This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
+		{
+		/* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
+		*file = (const char *)uristr;
+		return (2);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
+		uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
+		if (uristr2 == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Initialize the structure. */
+	memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
+
+	/*
+	 * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
+	 * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
+	 * and the last character in the URI.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
+	    (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
+		goto bad_uri;
+
+	tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
+	for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
+		{
+		/* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
+		name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
+		/* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
+		if (l2 == NULL)
+			goto bad_uri;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
+		 * attributes.
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+				{
+				uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
+				if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else
+			goto bad_uri;
+		}
+
+	/* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
+	if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	free(uristr2);
+	return (1);
+bad_uri:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+no_mem:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err:
+	pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
+ */
+void
+pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
+	{
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->token);
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->manuf);
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->serial);
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->model);
+	if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->object);
+	if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->objecttype);
+	if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+	if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
+		OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
+ * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
+ * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
+ * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
+ * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
+ * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
+ * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	if (token_info == NULL)
+		{
+		token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
+		if (token_info == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
+			{
+			goto urierr;
+			}
+
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
+		    (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
+		    (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+
+urierr:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
+	/* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
+ * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
+ * not have any affect on the policy.
+ *
+ * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
+ *
+ * Returns the caching policy number.
+ */
+int
+pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
+	{
+	char *value = NULL;
+	static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		return (policy);
+
+	value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
+
+	if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_NONE;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
+done:
+	return (policy);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
+ * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
+	{
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	/* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
+	if (token_pin != NULL)
+		goto ok;
+
+	if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
+		if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+	else
+		if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
+			{
+			if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+ok:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
+ * the normal memory caching.
+ *
+ * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
+ * mutex.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
+	{
+	void *addr = NULL;
+	long pagesize = 0;
+
+	/* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
+	if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
+	if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
+	if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
+		 * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
+		 */
+		if (errno == EPERM)
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
+		else
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
+
+		/*
+		 * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
+		 * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
+		 * anyway.
+		 */
+		(void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
+	token_pin = (char *)addr;
+	strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+    pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
+	 * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
+	 * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
+	 * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
+	 * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
+	 */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
+	    is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
+	    CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
+	 * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
+	 * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
+	 * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
+	 * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
+	 * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
+	 * C_Login().
+	 */
+	if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+			{
+			if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
+			    &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+		 * the engine.
+		 *
+		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+		 */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
+			    strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+			/*
+			 * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
+			 * would need to relogin).
+			 */
+			if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
+			    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+				{
+				passphrasedialog =
+				    strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+				if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
+					{
+					PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+					    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
+					goto err_locked;
+					}
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
+			 * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
+			 * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
+			 */
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
+			    POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
+				if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+					goto err_locked;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
+			 * login was done.
+			 */
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
+	 * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
+	 * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
+	 * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
+	 * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
+	 */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+
+	return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+err:
+	/* Always get rid of the PIN. */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
+ * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
+ * different so we need a separate function for this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
+	 * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
+	 * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
+	 * then.
+	 */
+	if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
+		{
+		char *pin = NULL;
+
+		/* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
+		if (token_pin != NULL)
+			pin = token_pin;
+		else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+		    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+
+		/* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
+		if (pin != token_pin)
+			{
+			memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+			OPENSSL_free(pin);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
+ * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
+ * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
+ * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
+ * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	allocated buffer on success
+ *	NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *
+run_askpass(char *dialog)
+	{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int n, p[2];
+	char *buf = NULL;
+
+	if (pipe(p) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	switch (pid = fork())
+		{
+		case -1:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
+			return (NULL);
+		/* child */
+		case 0:
+			/*
+			 * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
+			 * file descriptor shortage.
+			 */
+			close(p[0]);
+			(void) dup2(p[1], 1);
+			close(p[1]);
+			/*
+			 * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
+			 * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
+			 * so do not worry.
+			 */
+			(void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
+			exit(1);
+		/* parent */
+		default:
+			/* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
+			buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+			if (buf == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+
+			close(p[1]);
+			n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
+			if (n == -1 || n == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
+				OPENSSL_free(buf);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+			buf[n] = '\0';
+
+			(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+		}
+
+	return (buf);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5df42d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef	HW_PK11_URI_H
+#define	HW_PK11_URI_H
+
+#include <security/pkcs11t.h>
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */
+#define	PK11_URI_PREFIX		"pkcs11:"
+#define	FILE_URI_PREFIX		"file://"
+#define	PK11_TOKEN		"token"
+#define	PK11_MANUF		"manuf"
+#define	PK11_SERIAL		"serial"
+#define	PK11_MODEL		"model"
+#define	PK11_OBJECT		"object"
+#define	PK11_OBJECTTYPE		"objecttype"
+#define	PK11_ASKPASS		"passphrasedialog"
+
+/* PIN caching policy. */
+#define	POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED	0
+#define	POLICY_NONE		1
+#define	POLICY_MEMORY		2
+#define	POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY	3
+#define	POLICY_WRONG_VALUE	4
+
+/*
+ * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports.
+ */
+#define	PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN	256
+
+/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */
+typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct {
+	char	*object;	/* object label, the only mandatory info */
+	char	*objecttype;	/* (private|public|cert), currently unused */
+	char	*token;		/* token label */
+	char	*manuf;		/* manufacturer label */
+	char	*serial;	/* serial number label */
+	char	*model;		/* model label */
+	char	*askpass;	/* full path to the command to get the PIN */
+	/* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */
+	char	*pin;		/* token PIN */
+} pkcs11_uri;
+
+/* For URI processing. */
+extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
+
+int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin);
+int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void);
+int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+	const char **file);
+int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct);
+void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself);
+int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin);
+int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+	pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private);
+int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* HW_PK11_URI_H */
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/openssl-header.p5m b/openssl1.0.0/openssl-header.p5m
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..109b8ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/openssl-header.p5m
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+set name=pkg.fmri value=pkg:/library/openssl$(version-base)-headers@$(ips-version)
+set name=pkg.summary value="OpenSSL $(version-base) header files"
+set name=info.upstream-url value="$(home)"
+set name=info.source-url value="$(download)"
+
+license $(license-file) license=$(license)
+
+depend fmri=pkg:/library/openssl$(version-base)@$(ips-version) type=require
+depend fmri=pkg:/library/openssl$(version-base)@$(ips-version) type=incorporate
+depend fmri=pkg:/library/openssl0.9.8-headers@$(ips-version) type=exclude
+
+
+<transform file link path=.*usr/include/openssl.* -> \
+    default original_name library/security/openssl >
+
+dir path=usr
+dir path=usr/include
+
+# Wrapper for 32/64 bits:
+file wrapper-opensslconf.h path=usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+file $(protodir.32)/usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h path=usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.32.h
+file $(protodir.64)/usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h path=usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.64.h
+
+dir path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/pkgconfig
+file path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+file path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+file path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+link path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/libssl.so target=libssl.so.$(so-version)
+link path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.$(so-version)
+
+dir path=usr/lib/pkgconfig
+file path=usr/lib/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+file path=usr/lib/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+file path=usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+dir path=usr/include
+dir path=usr/include/openssl
+file path=usr/include/openssl/dsa.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/pem2.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/conf_api.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/aes.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/rand.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/dh.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ripemd.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/hmac.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/comp.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/sha.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/bio.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/whrlpool.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/lhash.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/des_old.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/cast.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/x509v3.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl2.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ocsp.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/cms.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/md4.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/safestack.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/conf.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/srp.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/seed.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/rc2.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl23.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/md5.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/symhacks.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ui.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl3.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/srtp.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ebcdic.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/camellia.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/cmac.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/x509.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ts.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/stack.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/des.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/engine.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/tls1.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/kssl.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/blowfish.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/pqueue.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/err.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/crypto.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/evp.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/bn.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/pem.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1t.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/objects.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/rc4.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/txt_db.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/modes.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/dso.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/dtls1.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/rsa.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/buffer.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/e_os2.h
+file path=usr/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/openssl.p5m b/openssl1.0.0/openssl.p5m
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..747d1f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/openssl.p5m
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+set name=pkg.fmri value=pkg:/library/openssl$(so-version)@$(ips-version)
+set name=pkg.summary value="OpenSSL $(version-base) shared libraries"
+set name=pkg.description value="$(description)"
+set name=info.upstream-url value="$(home)"
+set name=info.source-url value="$(download)"
+
+license $(license-file) license=$(license)
+
+<transform file link path=.*\.so.* -> \
+    default original_name library/security/openssl >
+
+dir path=usr
+dir path=usr/lib
+dir path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)
+dir path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines
+dir path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64
+
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/lib4758cca.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/lib4758cca.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libaep.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libaep.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libatalla.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libatalla.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libcapi.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libcapi.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libchil.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libchil.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libcswift.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libcswift.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libdevcrypto.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libdevcrypto.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libgmp.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libgmp.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libnuron.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libnuron.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libpadlock.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libpadlock.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libsureware.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libsureware.so
+file $(builddir.32)/engines/libubsec.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/libubsec.so
+
+file path=usr/lib/libssl.so.$(so-version)
+file path=usr/lib/libcrypto.so.$(so-version)
+
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/lib4758cca.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/lib4758cca.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libaep.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libaep.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libatalla.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libatalla.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libcapi.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libcapi.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libchil.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libchil.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libcswift.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libcswift.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libdevcrypto.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libdevcrypto.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libgmp.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libgmp.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libnuron.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libnuron.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libpadlock.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libpadlock.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libsureware.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libsureware.so
+file $(builddir.64)/engines/libubsec.so path=usr/lib/openssl-$(so-version)/engines/64/libubsec.so
+
+file path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/libssl.so.$(so-version)
+file path=usr/lib/$(mach64)/libcrypto.so.$(so-version)
+
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-1.0.1c.patch b/openssl1.0.0/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-1.0.1c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c768e8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-1.0.1c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+diff -dubr source/Configure ppp/Configure
+--- source/Configure	2012-03-15 02:20:40.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/Configure	2012-10-30 13:44:33.505890903 +0400
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 
+ # see INSTALL for instructions.
+ 
+-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+ 
+ # Options:
+ #
+@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
+ # --prefix      prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
+ #               (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
+ #
++# --pk11-libname  PKCS#11 library name.
++#               (Default: none)
++#
+ # --install_prefix  Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
+ #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
+ #               just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
+@@ -655,6 +658,9 @@
+ my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
+ my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
+ 
++# PKCS#11 engine patch
++my $pk11_libname="";
++
+ my $prefix="";
+ my $libdir="";
+ my $openssldir="";
+@@ -874,6 +880,10 @@
+ 				$_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
+ 				$flags.=$_." ";
+ 				}
++                        elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
++                                {
++                                $pk11_libname=$1;
++                                }
+ 			elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
+ 				{
+ 				$prefix=$1;
+@@ -1041,6 +1051,13 @@
+ 	exit 0;
+ }
+ 
++if (! $pk11_libname)
++        {
++        print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
++        print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
++        exit 1;
++        }
++
+ if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
+ 	$target = "Cygwin".$1;
+ }
+@@ -1207,6 +1224,8 @@
+ if ($flags ne "")	{ $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
+ else			{ $no_user_cflags=1;       }
+ 
++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
++
+ # Kerberos settings.  The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
+ # the script "config" or manually.
+ if (!$no_krb5)
+@@ -1596,6 +1615,7 @@
+ 	s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
+ 	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
+ 	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
++	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
+Only in ppp/: Configure.orig
+diff -dubr source/crypto/engine/eng_all.c ppp/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
+--- source/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2011-08-10 22:53:13.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2012-10-30 13:43:17.300794119 +0400
+@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@
+ 	ENGINE_load_rdrand();
+ #endif
+ 	ENGINE_load_dynamic();
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
++	ENGINE_load_pk11();
++#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA
+Only in ppp/crypto/engine: eng_all.c.orig
+diff -dubr source/crypto/engine/engine.h ppp/crypto/engine/engine.h
+--- source/crypto/engine/engine.h	2011-08-10 22:53:13.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/crypto/engine/engine.h	2012-10-30 13:46:54.858339430 +0400
+@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rsax(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+Only in ppp/crypto/engine: engine.h.orig
+diff -dubr source/crypto/engine/Makefile ppp/crypto/engine/Makefile
+--- source/crypto/engine/Makefile	2011-08-14 17:47:27.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/crypto/engine/Makefile	2012-10-30 13:48:02.183707468 +0400
+@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@
+ 	tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
+ 	tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
+ 	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
++ 	hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11_uri.c \
+ 	eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c
+ LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
+ 	eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
+ 	tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
+ 	tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
+ 	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
++ 	hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11_uri.o \
+ 	eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o
+ 
+ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+Only in ppp/crypto/engine: Makefile.orig
+diff -dubr source/include/openssl/engine.h ppp/include/openssl/engine.h
+--- source/include/openssl/engine.h	2011-08-10 22:53:13.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/include/openssl/engine.h	2012-10-30 13:46:54.858339430 +0400
+@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rsax(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+diff -dubr source/Makefile.org ppp/Makefile.org
+--- source/Makefile.org	2012-04-22 17:25:19.000000000 +0400
++++ ppp/Makefile.org	2012-10-30 13:43:17.299024078 +0400
+@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
+ INSTALL_PREFIX=
+ INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
++PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
++
+ # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+ OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/patches/28-enginesdir-1.0.1c.patch b/openssl1.0.0/patches/28-enginesdir-1.0.1c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a3407f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/patches/28-enginesdir-1.0.1c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -dubr source/Configure dir/Configure
+--- source/Configure	2012-03-15 02:20:40.000000000 +0400
++++ dir/Configure	2012-10-30 13:57:56.409598198 +0400
+@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
+ #               --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise)
+ # --prefix      prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
+ #               (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
++# --enginesdir  engines shared library location
++#               (Default: $prefix/lib/engines)
+ #
+ # --install_prefix  Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
+ #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
+@@ -658,6 +660,7 @@
+ my $prefix="";
+ my $libdir="";
+ my $openssldir="";
++my $enginesdir="";
+ my $exe_ext="";
+ my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}";
+ my $cross_compile_prefix="";
+@@ -886,6 +889,10 @@
+ 				{
+ 				$openssldir=$1;
+ 				}
++			elsif (/^--enginesdir=(.*)$/)
++				{
++				$enginesdir=$1;
++				}
+ 			elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/)
+ 				{
+ 				$install_prefix=$1;
+@@ -1186,6 +1193,11 @@
+ # we're ready to tolerate, so don't...
+ $multilib="" if !-d "$prefix/lib$multilib";
+ 
++if ($enginesdir eq "")
++	{
++		$enginesdir = "$prefix/lib$multilib/engines";
++	}
++
+ $libdir="lib$multilib" if $libdir eq "";
+ 
+ $cflags = "$cflags$exp_cflags";
+@@ -1802,7 +1814,7 @@
+ 		}
+ 	elsif	(/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/)
+ 		{
+-		my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines";
++		my $foo = $enginesdir;
+ 		$foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
+ 		print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n";
+ 		}
+Only in dir: Configure.orig
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/patches/29-devcrypto_engine-1.0.1c.patch b/openssl1.0.0/patches/29-devcrypto_engine-1.0.1c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cd6eed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/patches/29-devcrypto_engine-1.0.1c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff -dubr source/engines/Makefile dev/engines/Makefile
+--- source/engines/Makefile	2010-08-25 01:46:58.000000000 +0400
++++ dev/engines/Makefile	2012-10-30 14:30:06.780716474 +0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ 
+ LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+ LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi
++LIBNAMES += devcrypto
+ 
+ LIBSRC=	e_4758cca.c \
+ 	e_aep.c \
+@@ -51,6 +52,9 @@
+ 	e_padlock.o \
+ 	e_capi.o
+ 
++LIBSRC += e_devcrypto.c
++LIBOBJ += e_devcrypto.o
++
+ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+ 
+ EXHEADER= 
+@@ -63,7 +67,8 @@
+ 	e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \
+ 	e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \
+ 	e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \
+-	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h
++	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \
++	e_devcrypto_err.c e_devcrypto_err.h
+ 
+ ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+ 
+@@ -78,7 +83,7 @@
+ 		for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \
+ 			$(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \
+ 				LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \
+-				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \
++				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \
+ 				link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ 		done; \
+ 	else \
+Only in dev/engines: Makefile.orig
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/wrapper-opensslconf.h b/openssl1.0.0/wrapper-opensslconf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7179c4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/wrapper-opensslconf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#if defined(__sparcv9)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_ULTRASPARC                 
+# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_ULTRASPARC                
+#endif   
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64)
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.64.h>
+#else
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.32.h>
+#endif