diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c | 3277 |
1 files changed, 3277 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f6b328 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c @@ -0,0 +1,3277 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <libgen.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; + +/* + * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the + * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent. + */ +char *passphrasedialog; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* RSA stuff */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); + +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +#endif + +/* DSA stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); +static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +#endif + +/* DH stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, + const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); +#endif + +static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); +static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, + CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); +static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); + +static int pk11_pkey_meth_nids[] = {NID_dsa}; + +/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ +#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL +static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; +#else +static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; +#endif + +/* + * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11 + * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if + * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list + * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from + * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the + * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to + * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy(). + * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY. + */ +#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ + { \ + if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ + { \ + var = CK_TRUE; \ + if (unlock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the + * entry otherwise return NULL. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) + if (entry->h == h) + return (entry); + + return (NULL); + } + +/* + * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a + * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of + * failure. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + /* search for entry in the active list */ + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) + entry->refcnt++; + else + { + /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ + entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); + if (entry == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + entry->h = h; + entry->refcnt = 1; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ + if (active_list[type] == NULL) + active_list[type] = entry; + else /* make the entry first in the list */ + { + entry->next = active_list[type]; + active_list[type]->prev = entry; + active_list[type] = entry; + } + } + + return (entry->refcnt); + } + +/* + * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +void +pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *prev_entry; + + /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ + if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) + { + prev_entry->next = entry->next; + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = prev_entry; + } + else + { + active_list[type] = entry->next; + /* we were the first but not the only one */ + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = NULL; + } + + /* sanitization */ + entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(entry); + } + +/* Free all entries from the active list. */ +void +pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ + switch (type) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + } + +/* + * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, + * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. + * + * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, + * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); + entry->refcnt--; + if (entry->refcnt == 0) + { + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + return (1); + } + + return (0); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = + { + "PKCS#11 RSA method", + pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ + NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ + RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ + pk11_RSA_verify, /* rsa_verify */ + /* Internal rsa_keygen will be used if this is NULL. */ + NULL /* rsa_keygen */ + }; + +RSA_METHOD * +PK11_RSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_rsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = + { + "PKCS#11 DSA method", + pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ + NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ + pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ + NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL /* app_data */ + }; + +DSA_METHOD * +PK11_DSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_dsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* + * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for + * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but + * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by + * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be + * enough. + */ +#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 + +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = + { + "PKCS#11 DH method", + pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ + pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DH_init, /* init */ + pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + NULL /* generate_params */ + }; + +DH_METHOD * +PK11_DH(void) + { + return (&pk11_dh); + } +#endif + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ +#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 +#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Similar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to + * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not + * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. + * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + + +/* + * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors + * should be caught in the padding functions + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. + */ + for (j = 0; j < r; j++) + if (buf[j] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + j; + j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's here + */ + for (i = 0; i < r; i++) + if (buf[i] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + i; + i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* + * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and + * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_encrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and + * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, + rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + retval = ul_sig_len; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and + * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit + * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, + p_mech, h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, + * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. + */ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + return (1); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need + * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum + * structures. + */ + if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from + * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. + * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c + */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long ulsiglen; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + ulsiglen = j; + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); + *siglen = ulsiglen; + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto err; + } + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, + (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +#define MAXATTR 1024 +/* + * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *privkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + const char *file; + int ret; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* We look for private keys only. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we + * never ask for private components. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in + * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in + * the 'privkey_id' parameter. + */ + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */ + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find + * is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + + /* + * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to + * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL + * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate + * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used + * many times. We do not check the return value because even in + * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports + * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->persistent = CK_TRUE; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now + * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + + /* + * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take + * care of handle management ourselves. + */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + + /* + * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + /* + * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as + * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key + * in the keystore. + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + } + else + if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(privkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, + rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *pubkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */ + int ret; + const char *file; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + /* + * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA + * structure. No cache hit is possible. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + + /* + * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Create a session object from it so that when calling + * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The + * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA + * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for + * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears + * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if + * we always have a session key. Note that this is different + * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that + * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore + * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. + */ + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(pubkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, + rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + else + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the + * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and + * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new + * session object is created and put also onto the active object list. + * + * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in + * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + int i; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue); + + a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); + a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e' + * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference + * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be + * NULL here. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, + &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, + &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, + &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, + &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, + &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL. + * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can + * use only public components for searching for the private key handle. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + ul_key_attr_count = 8; + /* + * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing + * session keys. + */ + a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + /* + * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we + * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was + * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key + * types we just create a new session key using the private + * components from the RSA structure. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private + * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we + * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented + * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it + * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no + * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read + * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage. + */ + if (rsa->d != NULL) + { + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + } + else + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + + /* + * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well + * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache + * 'n'/'e' components as well. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed upon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA + * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + * + * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public + * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we + * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public + * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for + * both data signing and verifying. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing private key + * object. We can just create a public object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA + * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should + * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component + * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are + * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub() + * about why we compare the handle as well. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing public key + * object. We can just create a private object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* The DSA function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + + +static DSA_SIG * +pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) + { + BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + int i; + DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; + + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + + /* + * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, + * each is 20 bytes long + */ + unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto ret; + } + + (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + + if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || + BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + dsa_sig->r = r; + dsa_sig->s = s; + +ret: + if (dsa_sig == NULL) + { + if (r != NULL) + BN_free(r); + if (s != NULL) + BN_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (dsa_sig); + } + +static int +pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, + DSA *dsa) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + int retval = 0; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + + unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto ret; + } + + /* + * The representation of each of the two big numbers could + * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need + * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. + */ + (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - + BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); + + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + retval = 1; +ret: + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. + * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, + &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure + * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed apon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* The DH function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* + * Generate DH key-pair. + * + * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key + * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key + * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard + * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem + * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. + */ +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) + { + CK_ULONG i; + CK_RV rv, rv1; + int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; + + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)} + }; + + CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) + { + /* + * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that + * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of + * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. + */ + pub_key_template[1].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) + { + pub_key_template[2].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + /* + * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting + * a session handle. The objects created in this function are + * destroyed before return and thus not cached. + */ + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, + &mechanism, + pub_key_template, + ul_pub_key_attr_count, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_pub_key, + &h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory + * should be sufficient for reuse. + */ + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + else + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) + { + rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || + ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) + { + if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); + pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, + DH *dh) + { + int i; + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + goto err; + + priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; + priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); + mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); + if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); + + (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); + + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = + pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, + &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, + &mechanism, + h_key, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + priv_key_result[0].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); + if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same + * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key + */ + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + /* + * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip + * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, + * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The + * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was + * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading + * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the + * pre-master secret. + */ + for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) + { + if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) + break; + } + + (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); + ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; + } + +err: + + if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); + priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; + } + + if (mechanism.pParameter) + { + OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); + mechanism.pParameter = NULL; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, + DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + }; + + key_template[0].pValue = &class; + key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); + + key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); + + key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); + key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dh_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dh; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); + key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + * + * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh + * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. + */ +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key + * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached + * in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + +/* + * Local function to simplify key template population + * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error + */ +static int +init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, + CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) + { + CK_ULONG len; + + /* + * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to + * check that here than individually in the callers. + */ + if (bn != NULL) + len = BN_num_bytes(bn); + + if (bn == NULL || len == 0) + return (1); + + *ul_value_len = len; + *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); + if (*p_value == NULL) + return (0); + + BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); + + return (1); + } + +static void +attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) + { + if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) + *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); + } + +/* + * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or + * if we find more objects based on the template we got. + * + * Returns: + * 1 OK + * 0 no object or more than 1 object found + */ +static int +find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG objcnt; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (objcnt > 1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + else + if (objcnt == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (1); +err: + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (0); + } + +/* + * OpenSSL 1.0.0 introduced ENGINE API for the PKEY EVP functions. Sadly, + * "openssl dgst -dss1 ..." now uses a new function EVP_DigestSignInit() which + * internally needs a PKEY method for DSA even when in the engine. So, to avoid + * a regression when moving from 0.9.8 to 1.0.0, we use an internal OpenSSL + * structure for the DSA PKEY methods to make it work. It is a future project to + * make it work with HW acceleration. + * + * Note that at the time of 1.0.0d release there is no documentation as to how + * the PKEY EVP functions are to be implemented in an engine. There is only one + * engine shipped with 1.0.0d that uses the PKEY EVP methods, the GOST engine. + * It was used as an example when fixing the above mentioned regression problem. + */ +int +pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids, + int nid) + { + if (pmeth == NULL) + { + *nids = pk11_pkey_meth_nids; + return (1); + } + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_dsa: + *pmeth = (EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)EVP_PKEY_meth_find(nid); + return (1); + } + + /* Error branch. */ + *pmeth = NULL; + return (0); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |