OpenSSL 1.0.x

1 files changed, 3924 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f35714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3924 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
+#define	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
+#endif
+
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+
+#define	PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
+ * initialization.
+ */
+int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock = NULL;
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
+ */
+int *hw_cnids;
+int *hw_dnids;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+enum pk11_cipher_id {
+	PK11_DES_CBC,
+	PK11_DES3_CBC,
+	PK11_DES_ECB,
+	PK11_DES3_ECB,
+	PK11_RC4,
+	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
+	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
+};
+
+/* Index for the supported digests */
+enum pk11_digest_id {
+	PK11_MD5,
+	PK11_SHA1,
+	PK11_SHA224,
+	PK11_SHA256,
+	PK11_SHA384,
+	PK11_SHA512,
+	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
+};
+
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	int			iv_len;
+	int			min_key_len;
+	int			max_key_len;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_CIPHER;
+
+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_DIGEST;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len);
+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+	size_t count);
+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+    int *local_cipher_nids);
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
+    int *local_digest_nids);
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+    PK11_DIGEST *digest);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
+static int hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type)	\
+	{								\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
+		{							\
+		retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
+		    sp->persistent);					\
+		}							\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	}
+
+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+static int cipher_count		= 0;
+static int digest_count		= 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Static list of ciphers.
+ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
+ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
+ */
+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+	{
+	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
+		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
+		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Static list of digests.
+ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
+ * thus digests[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
+ */
+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
+	{
+	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
+	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
+	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
+	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
+	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
+	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
+	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
+	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ *
+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
+ */
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_cbc,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ecb,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	16, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	16, 24, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	16, 32, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_bf_cbc,
+	8, 16, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+	{
+	NID_rc4,
+	1, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
+	{
+	NID_md5,
+	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	MD5_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
+	{
+	NID_sha1,
+	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+	{
+	NID_sha224,
+	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
+	{
+	NID_sha256,
+	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
+	{
+	NID_sha384,
+	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
+	{
+	NID_sha512,
+	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define	PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+	{
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+		"SO_PATH",
+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+	{
+	pk11_rand_seed,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
+	pk11_rand_add,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_status
+	};
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+static ENGINE* pk11_engine = NULL;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		session_cache[type].lock =
+		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+			goto malloc_err;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	/* Free uri_lock */
+	(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(uri_lock);
+	OPENSSL_free(uri_lock);
+	uri_lock = NULL;
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
+	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+			return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, pk11_engine_pkey_methods))
+		return (0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	if (pk11_have_random)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+		return (0);
+
+/*
+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
+	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
+#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+	{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!ret)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
+		{
+		ENGINE_free(ret);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+int
+pk11_engine_loaded()
+	{
+	ENGINE *e;
+	int rtrn = 0;
+
+	if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_pk11_id)) != NULL)
+		{
+		rtrn = 1;
+		ENGINE_free(e);
+		}
+	return (rtrn);
+	}
+
+void
+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not attempt to load the engine twice!
+	 * Multiple instances would share static variables from this file.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_engine_loaded())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
+	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
+	 */
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
+	if (!e_pk11)
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
+	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
+	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
+	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
+	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	}
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+	}
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+	}
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return (pk11_library_init(e));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function that unsets reference to current engine (pk11_engine = NULL).
+ *
+ * Use of local variable only seems clumsy, it needs to be this way!
+ * This is to prevent double free in the unlucky scenario:
+ *     ENGINE_free calls pk11_destroy calls pk11_finish calls ENGINE_free
+ * Setting pk11_engine to NULL prior to ENGINE_free() avoids this.
+ */
+static void pk11_engine_free()
+	{
+	ENGINE* old_engine = pk11_engine;
+
+	if (old_engine) {
+		pk11_engine = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(old_engine);
+	}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_INFO info;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+	int any_slot_found;
+	int i;
+
+	if (e != pk11_engine)
+		{
+		pk11_engine_free();
+		pk11_engine = e;
+		ENGINE_up_ref(e);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
+	 * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
+	 * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
+	 * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
+	 * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
+	 * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
+	 * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
+	 * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
+	 * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+			{
+			return (1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			/*
+			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+			 * engine first.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_all_locks();
+			}
+		}
+
+
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		{
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+		if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/*
+	 * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
+	 * NIDs there.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+	if (!p)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+	 * because no slot was present.
+	 */
+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
+	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
+	 */
+	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
+			== CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
+		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
+		digest_count = 0;
+	}
+
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+	pk11_pid = getpid();
+	/*
+	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+	 * will do the cleanup.
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+		goto err;
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int rtn = 1;
+
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+	if (pk11_library_initialized == CK_TRUE)
+		rtn = pk11_finish(e);
+
+	return (rtn);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure, right engine instance is being destroyed.
+	 * Engine e may be the wrong instance if
+	 * 	1) either someone calls ENGINE_load_pk11 twice
+	 * 	2) or last ref. to an already finished engine is being destroyed
+	 */
+	if (e != pk11_engine)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* free all active lists */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects.
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	{
+		ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL;
+		if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+		if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+		if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) {
+			ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr);
+			if (ob != NULL)
+				ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pk11_dso = NULL;
+	pFuncList = NULL;
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+	pk11_pid = 0;
+	pk11_engine_free();
+	/*
+	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+	 * the engine before calling fork().
+	 */
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+	{
+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		if (initialized)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+	default:
+		break;
+		}
+
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
+	 */
+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+	{
+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	static pid_t pid = 0;
+	pid_t new_pid;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+	 * here, with no PID information.
+	 */
+	if (pid == 0)
+		pid = getpid();
+
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp = freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+	 * structure from the freelist.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+		/*
+		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+		 * mark them as unused.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	else
+		freelist = sp->next;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+	 */
+	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+		{
+		pid = new_pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+		 * head of the list).
+		 */
+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+			{
+			freelist = sp1->next;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+			}
+
+		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
+		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+		/* Initialize the process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+		 * information.
+		 */
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+			goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+		 * re-initialization.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+			 * the caller cope with the situation.
+			 */
+			freelist = sp;
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->pid == 0)
+		{
+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+	if (sp != NULL)
+		sp->next = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+
+	return (sp);
+	}
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+		return;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return;
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp->next = freelist;
+	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	}
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+	 * return 0 on exit.
+	 */
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+		{
+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+				ret = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_RAND:
+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			myslot = SLOTID;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
+		 * reinitialize of the session
+		 */
+		pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+			return (0);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+		}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->pid = getpid();
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+	 */
+	sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
+ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
+ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
+ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
+ */
+static void
+destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DH);
+		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
+ *
+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
+ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+err:
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+	 */
+	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+		return (1);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
+static int
+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
+			return (ciphers[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (cipher_count > 0)
+		*nids = cipher_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (cipher_count);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (digest_count > 0)
+		*nids = digest_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (digest_count);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
+	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+	/*
+	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
+	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
+	 * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+		{
+		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
+		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
+		/*
+		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
+		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
+		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
+		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
+		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
+		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
+		 */
+		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+		{
+		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+			{
+			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
+			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+	else
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
+		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
+	/*
+	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
+	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
+	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
+	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
+	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
+	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
+	 * code serves as a sanity check.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
+	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
+	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
+	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
+	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
+	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
+	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
+	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
+	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		state->sp = sp;
+		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+			return (0);
+
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
+	 * needs to be created.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
+			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
+		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+			{
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
+	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
+ * that it needs not be recreated.
+ *
+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long outl = inl;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
+	if (!inl)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
+	 * the same size of input.
+	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
+	 * correctly aligned buffers.
+	 */
+	if (inl != outl)
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
+		 * rid of the context.
+		 */
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+		else
+			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!cipher)
+		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_bf_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_rc4:
+			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+			break;
+		default:
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+			/*
+			 * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
+			 * here are not constants.
+			 */
+			if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
+			else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+			*cipher = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*cipher != NULL);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!digest)
+		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			*digest = &pk11_md5;
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * A special case. For "openssl dgst -dss1 -engine pkcs11 ...",
+		 * OpenSSL calls EVP_get_digestbyname() on "dss1" which ends up
+		 * calling pk11_engine_digests() for NID_dsa. Internally, if an
+		 * engine is not used, OpenSSL uses SHA1_Init() as expected for
+		 * DSA. So, we must return pk11_sha1() for NID_dsa as well. Note
+		 * that this must have changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 since we
+		 * did not have the problem with the 0.9.8 version.
+		 */
+		case NID_sha1:
+		case NID_dsa:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha224:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha384:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*digest = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*digest != NULL);
+	}
+
+
+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
+	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
+	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
+	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
+	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
+	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
+	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
+	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
+	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
+	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
+	 * terminate the active operation.
+	 */
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the key information used in this session.
+	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
+	 */
+	sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
+		PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
+	(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+err:
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+static int
+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
+		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+			return (digests[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	pdp = &digests[index];
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
+	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
+	if (count == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
+		count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long len;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
+		return (0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
+	 * to the pool
+	 */
+	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
+	if (from->md_data == NULL || to->digest->ctx_size == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* The copy-from state */
+	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
+	if (state->sp == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
+	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
+		goto err;
+	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
+	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (ul_state_len == 0)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
+	if (pstate == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
+		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
+		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (pstate != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
+static int
+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
+	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
+		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
+		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
+		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
+		 * will return the session to the cache.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
+ * prefix.
+ */
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
+	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+		{
+		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * The secret key object is created in the
+			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
+			 */
+			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
+				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKM_DSA
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
+ * CKM_DES_CBC
+ * CKM_AES_CBC
+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
+ * CKM_DES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_CTR
+ * CKM_RC4
+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
+ *
+ * Digests optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_MD5
+ * CKM_SHA_1
+ * CKM_SHA224
+ * CKM_SHA256
+ * CKM_SHA384
+ * CKM_SHA512
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+	{
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int slot_n_digest = 0;
+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
+	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 0;
+
+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+			&mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
+			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
+			 */
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+			    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
+
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
+				{
+				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
+			&mech_info);
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
+			}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
+		 * derivation.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+		    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
+				{
+				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
+		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
+			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+			/*
+			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
+			 * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
+			 */
+			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+			    PK11_DBG);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			    best_slot_sofar);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
+			}
+		} /* for */
+
+	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+		}
+
+	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+		(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+		(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
+		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_cipher);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_digest);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n",
+			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
+		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
+		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
+		 */
+		if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
+		    (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
+				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
+			cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
+			digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
+			(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+			(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
+
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 1;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+		{
+		if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
+		    mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
+			    " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
+			    cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
+			    mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
+			return;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
+			    cipher->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
+		{
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
+			    digest->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+	{
+	ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+	int nid;
+
+	if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
+	    1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
+		{
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* will return NID_undef on error */
+	nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
+	ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+
+	return (nid);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
+ * have to help ourselves here.
+ */
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+	{
+	/* are we already set? */
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
+	 * follow the format of those that exist.
+	 */
+	if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
+		    current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
+		    local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
+ *
+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
+ * asymmetric operations.
+ *
+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
+ *
+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
+ * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
+ * the code won't be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#else
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
+ */
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	void *handle;
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
+	int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+	/*
+	 * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own
+	 * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions
+	 * from the top-level PKCS#11 library.
+	 */
+	if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
+	    PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+		    PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		/* this means empty tables */
+		hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also
+	 * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
+	 * search.
+	 */
+	hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+	hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
+	tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
+	tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
+	 * is zero now.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
+		 * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+		 */
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
+		pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
+	 * dlclose(3C).
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+	OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	(void) dlclose(handle);
+	hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
+	hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
+	if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs unless the mechanism is
+ * supported directly in a CPU instruction set. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
+ * non-existent).
+ */
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+	{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Special case first. NULL means that we are initializing a new table.
+	 */
+	if (nid_table == NULL)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have an AES instruction set on SPARC we route everything
+	 * through the Crypto Framework (ie., through pkcs11_softtoken in this
+	 * case). This is for T4 which has HW instructions for AES, DES, MD5,
+	 * SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, MONTMUL, and MPMUL.
+	 *
+	 * On Intel, if we have AES-NI instruction set we route AES to the
+	 * Crypto Framework. Intel CPUs do not have other instruction sets for
+	 * HW crypto acceleration so we check the HW NID table for any other
+	 * mechanism.
+	 */
+#if defined(__x86)
+	if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1)
+		{
+		switch (nid)
+			{
+			case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+				return (1);
+			}
+		/*
+		 * These are variables, cannot be used as case expressions.
+		 */
+		if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+		    nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+		    nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+			{
+				return (1);
+			}
+		}
+#elif defined(__sparc)
+	if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1)
+		return (1);
+#endif
+
+	/* The table is never full, there is always at least one NID_undef. */
+	while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+		{
+		if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
+			return (1);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Do we have an AES instruction set? */
+static int
+hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void)
+	{
+	static int present = -1;
+
+	if (present == -1)
+		{
+		uint_t ui = 0;
+
+		(void) getisax(&ui, 1);
+
+#if defined(__amd64) || defined(__i386)
+		present = (ui & AV_386_AES) > 0;
+#elif defined(__sparc)
+		present = (ui & (AV_SPARC_AES|AV_SPARC_FJAES)) > 0;
+#endif
+		}
+
+	return (present);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */