diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c | 870 |
1 files changed, 870 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c b/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db98b11 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c @@ -0,0 +1,870 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> +#include <libgen.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +/* + * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one + * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI + * processing. + */ +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +/* + * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not + * cache the PIN by default. + */ +static char *token_pin; + +static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin); +static char *run_askpass(char *dialog); + +/* + * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to + * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using + * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated + * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take + * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted + * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN. + * + * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after + * the fork. + * + * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock" + * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function. + * + * Returns: + * 0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL) + * 1 if we got the PIN + */ +#define EXEC_SPEC "exec:" +#define BUILTIN_SPEC "builtin" +int +pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin) + { + /* Initialize as an error. */ + *pin = NULL; + + if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0) + { + /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */ + *pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: "); + if (*pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + else + { + char *pw; + + /* + * getpassphrase() uses an internal buffer to hold the + * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer + * with '\0'. + */ + if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + /* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */ + memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin)); + *pin = pw; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + } + else + { + /* + * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output + * of an external command. + */ + if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0) + { + dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC); + if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL) + goto err; + } + else + { + /* + * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog + * keyword. + */ + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC); + goto err; + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the + * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present + * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes + * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct' + * structure. + * + * Returns: + * 0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN + * 1 if all is OK + * 2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string + * pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points + * inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present. + */ +int +pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, + const char **file) + { + char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name; + + /* Check the "file://" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0) + { + *file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX); + return (2); + } + + /* This is the "pkcs11:" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0) + { + /* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */ + *file = (const char *)uristr; + return (2); + } + else + { + /* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */ + uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)); + if (uristr2 == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Initialize the structure. */ + memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct)); + + /* + * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We + * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first + * and the last character in the URI. + */ + if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' || + (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';')) + goto bad_uri; + + tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1); + for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1)) + { + /* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */ + name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2); + /* Check whether there is '=' at all. */ + if (l2 == NULL) + goto bad_uri; + + /* + * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit + * attributes. + */ + if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0) + if (uri_struct->token == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0) + if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->serial == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->model == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0) + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0) + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + { + uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2); + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0) + if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else + goto bad_uri; + } + + /* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */ + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL); + goto err; + } + + free(uristr2); + return (1); +bad_uri: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); +no_mem: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err: + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside. + */ +void +pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself) + { + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + free(uri_struct->token); + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + free(uri_struct->manuf); + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + free(uri_struct->serial); + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + free(uri_struct->model); + if (uri_struct->object != NULL) + free(uri_struct->object); + if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL) + free(uri_struct->objecttype); + if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + free(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE) + OPENSSL_free(uri_struct); + } + +/* + * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is + * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that + * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note + * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to + * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see + * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11 + * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct) + { + CK_RV rv; + static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO)); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label, + strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0) + { + goto urierr; + } + + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf, + (char *)token_info->manufacturerID, + strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model, + strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial, + (char *)token_info->serialNumber, + strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); + +urierr: + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH); + /* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */ +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the + * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will + * not have any affect on the policy. + * + * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked. + * + * Returns the caching policy number. + */ +int +pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void) + { + char *value = NULL; + static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED) + return (policy); + + value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY"); + + if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_NONE; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE); +done: + return (policy); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or + * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_cache_pin(char *pin) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + goto ok; + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY) + if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + else + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY) + { + if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0) + goto err; + } + +ok: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to + * the normal memory caching. + * + * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock" + * mutex. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +static int +mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin) + { + void *addr = NULL; + long pagesize = 0; + + /* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */ + if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */ + if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */ + if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1) + { + /* + * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common + * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues. + */ + if (errno == EPERM) + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING); + else + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED); + + /* + * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check + * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet + * anyway. + */ + (void) munmap(addr, pagesize); + goto err; + } + + /* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */ + token_pin = (char *)addr; + strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of + * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from + * multiple threads. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private) + { + CK_RV rv; + + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); + goto err; + } + + /* + * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even + * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to + * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may + * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the + * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set. + */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || + is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags & + CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into + * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we + * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in + * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded + * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to + * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a + * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before + * C_Login(). + */ + if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE) + { + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass, + &uri_struct->pin) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from + * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. + * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in + * the engine. + * + * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. + * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. + */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, + CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin, + strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which + * would need to relogin). + */ + if (passphrasedialog == NULL && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + passphrasedialog = + strdup(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (passphrasedialog == NULL) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + } + + /* + * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might + * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required - + * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory. + */ + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == + POLICY_WRONG_VALUE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID); + goto err_locked; + } + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE) + if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0) + goto err_locked; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + else + { + /* + * If token does not require login we take it as the + * login was done. + */ + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + } + + /* + * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that + * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the + * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the + * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with + * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it. + */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + + return (1); + +err_locked: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); +err: + /* Always get rid of the PIN. */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There + * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite + * different so we need a separate function for this. + * + * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is + * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again. + * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session + * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token + * then. + */ + if (passphrasedialog != NULL) + { + char *pin = NULL; + + /* If we cached the PIN then use it. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + pin = token_pin; + else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0) + goto err; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + + /* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */ + if (pin != token_pin) + { + memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); + OPENSSL_free(pin); + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we + * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able + * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we + * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed + * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose(). + * + * Returns: + * allocated buffer on success + * NULL on failure + */ +static char * +run_askpass(char *dialog) + { + pid_t pid; + int n, p[2]; + char *buf = NULL; + + if (pipe(p) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED); + return (NULL); + } + + switch (pid = fork()) + { + case -1: + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED); + return (NULL); + /* child */ + case 0: + /* + * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on + * file descriptor shortage. + */ + close(p[0]); + (void) dup2(p[1], 1); + close(p[1]); + /* + * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are + * in the child. However, parent will get read() error + * so do not worry. + */ + (void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL); + exit(1); + /* parent */ + default: + /* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */ + buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); + } + + close(p[1]); + n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN); + if (n == -1 || n == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return (NULL); + } + buf[n] = '\0'; + + (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + } + + return (buf); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |