diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c | 3837 |
1 files changed, 3837 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c b/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6107744 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl0.9.8/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c @@ -0,0 +1,3837 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/aes.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <dlfcn.h> +#include <pthread.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ +#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" +/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ +#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more + * information. + */ +#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) +#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#endif + +/* + * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither + * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, + * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then + * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's + * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. + */ +#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine" +#include "hw_pk11_err.c" + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine + * initialization. + */ +int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* + * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), + * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the + * RSA keys by reference feature. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel + * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. + */ +int *hw_cnids; +int *hw_dnids; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ +static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; + +/* + * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when + * logging into the token. + */ +CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +/* + * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for + * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given + * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be + * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already + * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each + * PK11_SESSION object. + * + * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the + * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also + * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another + * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in + * invalid handle returned from the search operation. + * + * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. + * They are also used for active list protection. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one + * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session + * list) for given algorithm type + */ +PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available + * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed + * without losing the secret key objects. + */ +static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + +/* ENGINE level stuff */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int pk11_rand_status(void); + +/* These functions are also used in other files */ +PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ +extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); +extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif + +/* Local helper functions */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent); +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); + +/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ +static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ +static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); +static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); +static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc); +static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); +static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid); +static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len); +static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, + size_t count); +static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); +static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); +static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids); +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, + int *local_digest_nids); +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, + int id); +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id); + +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* Index for the supported ciphers */ +enum pk11_cipher_id { + PK11_DES_CBC, + PK11_DES3_CBC, + PK11_DES_ECB, + PK11_DES3_ECB, + PK11_RC4, + PK11_AES_128_CBC, + PK11_AES_192_CBC, + PK11_AES_256_CBC, + PK11_AES_128_ECB, + PK11_AES_192_ECB, + PK11_AES_256_ECB, + PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + PK11_AES_128_CTR, + PK11_AES_192_CTR, + PK11_AES_256_CTR, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + PK11_CIPHER_MAX +}; + +/* Index for the supported digests */ +enum pk11_digest_id { + PK11_MD5, + PK11_SHA1, + PK11_SHA224, + PK11_SHA256, + PK11_SHA384, + PK11_SHA512, + PK11_DIGEST_MAX +}; + +#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \ + { \ + if (uselock) \ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ + { \ + retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ + sp->persistent); \ + } \ + if (uselock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + } + +static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; +static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; +static int cipher_count = 0; +static int digest_count = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; + +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st + { + enum pk11_cipher_id id; + int nid; + int iv_len; + int min_key_len; + int max_key_len; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_CIPHER; + +static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = + { + { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, + { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, + { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, + CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, + { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, + CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ + { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + }; + +typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st + { + enum pk11_digest_id id; + int nid; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_DIGEST; + +static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = + { + {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, + {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, + {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, + {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, + {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, + {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, + {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, + }; + +/* + * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 + * session in multiple cipher_update calls + */ +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; + + +/* + * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets + * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. + * + * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. + */ + +/* DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = + { + NID_des_cbc, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* 3DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = + { + NID_des_ede3_cbc, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ecb, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ede3_ecb, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = + { + NID_aes_128_cbc, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = + { + NID_aes_192_cbc, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = + { + NID_aes_256_cbc, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = + { + NID_aes_128_ecb, + 16, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = + { + NID_aes_192_ecb, + 16, 24, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = + { + NID_aes_256_ecb, + 16, 32, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are + * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures + * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. + */ +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = + { + NID_bf_cbc, + 8, 16, 8, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = + { + NID_rc4, + 1, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = + { + NID_md5, + NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + MD5_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = + { + NID_sha1, + NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = + { + NID_sha224, + NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, + SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = + { + NID_sha256, + NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = + { + NID_sha384, + NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = + { + NID_sha512, + NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine + */ +#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = + { + { + PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, + "SO_PATH", + "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + + +static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = + { + pk11_rand_seed, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_cleanup, + pk11_rand_add, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_status + }; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; +static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support"; + +CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; +static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; + +/* + * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function + * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether + * this is 32 or 64 bit build. + */ +static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; +/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ +CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static int pk11_pid = 0; + +static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; + +/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + session_cache[type].lock = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL); + } + + return (1); + +malloc_err: + pk11_free_all_locks(); + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); + find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); + OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); + session_cache[type].lock = NULL; + } + } + } + +/* + * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. + */ +static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; + RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + if (!pk11_library_init(e)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || + !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || + !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) + return (0); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + if (pk11_have_random) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) + return (0); + +/* + * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup + * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp + * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. + * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; + pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_pk11_strings(); + + return (1); + } + +/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) + return (0); + + if (!bind_pk11(e)) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) + +#else +static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + + if (!ret) + return (NULL); + + if (!bind_pk11(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return (NULL); + } + + return (ret); + } + +void +ENGINE_load_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; + + /* + * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to + * security reasons. We will link it in statically. + */ + /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ + if (!pk11_dso) + pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + return; + } + + e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); + if (!e_pk11) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + return; + } + + /* + * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically + * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 + * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter + * needs cipher and digest algorithm information + */ + if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + return; + } + + ENGINE_add(e_pk11); + + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and + * the function symbol names to bind to. + */ +static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + return (PK11_LIBNAME); + + return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); + } + +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); + + PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + } + +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + + return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); + } + +/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ +static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + } + +/* release all engine specific mutexes */ +static void pk11_fork_parent(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* + * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them + * accessible to all threads. + */ +static void pk11_fork_child(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + return (pk11_library_init(e)); +} + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also + * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and + * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function + * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) + { + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + int any_slot_found; + int i; + + /* + * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called + * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one + * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more + * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen + * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a + * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be + * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes + * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID + * check so that we properly initialize the engine again. + */ + if (pk11_library_initialized) + { + if (pk11_pid == getpid()) + { + return (1); + } + else + { + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + /* + * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case + * the application calls fork() without finishing the + * engine first. + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + } + } + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all + * NIDs there. + */ + if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ + p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); + if (!p) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + rv = p(&pFuncList); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any + * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an + * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 + * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just + * because no slot was present. + */ + if (any_slot_found == 0) + return (1); + + if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, + PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since + * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function + */ + if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) + == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " + "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + digest_count = 0; + } + + pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE; + pk11_pid = getpid(); + /* + * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() + * will do the cleanup. + */ + if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + session_cache[i].head = NULL; + /* + * initialize active lists. We only use active lists + * for asymmetric ciphers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + active_list[i] = NULL; + + if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) + { + if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, + pk11_fork_child) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE; + } + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); + return (1); + } + +/* + * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 + * library. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + int i; + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); + + if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) + goto err; + + /* free all active lists */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + pk11_free_active_list(i); + + pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. + */ +#if 0 + pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + { + ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL; + if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + } +#endif + + if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + pk11_dso = NULL; + pFuncList = NULL; + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + pk11_pid = 0; + /* + * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than + * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason + * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out + * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes + * the engine before calling fork(). + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) + { + int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); + + switch (cmd) + { + case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + if (initialized) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + return (0); + } + + return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); + default: + break; + } + + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + return (0); + } + + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) + { + return; + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since + * the calling functions do not care anyway + */ + pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + + return; + } + +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) + { + pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); + } + +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (1); + } + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static int pk11_rand_status(void) + { + return (1); + } + +/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ +static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + +/* + * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have + * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here + * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. + * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. + */ +PK11_SESSION * +pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + static pid_t pid = 0; + pid_t new_pid; + CK_RV rv; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (NULL); + } + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + + /* + * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in + * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session + * here, with no PID information. + */ + if (pid == 0) + pid = getpid(); + + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp = freelist; + + /* + * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled + * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first + * structure from the freelist. + */ + if (sp == NULL) + { + if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); + + /* + * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the + * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so + * mark them as unused. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + freelist = sp->next; + + /* + * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all + * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. + */ + if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) + { + pid = new_pid; + + /* + * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited + * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which + * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the + * head of the list). + */ + while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) + { + freelist = sp1->next; + /* + * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() + * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 + * sessions and destroy all objects. + */ + pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp1); + } + + /* we have to free the active list as well. */ + pk11_free_active_list(optype); + + /* Initialize the process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this + * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one + * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. + * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more + * information. + */ +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) + goto err; + + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs + * re-initialization. + */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) + { + /* + * We will keep the session in the cache list and let + * the caller cope with the situation. + */ + freelist = sp; + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + + if (sp->pid == 0) + { + /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + } + } + + /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ + session_cache[optype].head = freelist; + +err: + if (sp != NULL) + sp->next = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + + return (sp); + } + + +void +pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + PK11_SESSION *freelist; + + /* + * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and + * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the + * next time we will ask for a new session. + */ + if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) + return; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return; + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp->next = freelist; + session_cache[optype].head = sp; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + } + + +/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions() + { + int ret = 1; + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); + + /* + * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will + * return 0 on exit. + */ + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many + * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we + * return an error on return. + */ +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + int ret = 1; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) + { + if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + ret = 0; + } + } + freelist = sp->next; + pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + return (ret); + } + + +static int +pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID myslot; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_RAND: + myslot = rand_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + myslot = SLOTID; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) + { + /* + * We are probably a child process so force the + * reinitialize of the session + */ + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) + return (0); + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + sp->pid = getpid(); + + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + case OP_CIPHER: + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent + * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. + */ + sp->persistent = CK_FALSE; + return (1); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code, + * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the + * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying + * a public or a private key, we always free what we can. + */ +static void +destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + } + +/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DH); + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DH key object wrapper. + * + * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure + * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } +err: + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +static int +pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects + * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so + * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. + */ + if (persistent == CK_TRUE) + return (1); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, + rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + + +/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ + +static int +cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) + if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) + return (ciphers[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) + { + if (cipher_count > 0) + *nids = cipher_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (cipher_count); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) + { + if (digest_count > 0) + *nids = digest_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (digest_count); + } + +/* + * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. + */ +static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, + PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) + { + CK_RV rv; +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + + /* + * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and + * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before + * pk11_init_symetric() is called. + */ + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); + pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); + /* + * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, + * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 + * needs. For more information on internal structure of the + * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can + * add code so that the counter length can be set via + * ENGINE_ctrl() function. + */ + ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + { + if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; + pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; + } + } + + /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) + { + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) + return (0); + + p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; + /* + * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the + * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our + * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From + * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a + * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key + * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this + * code serves as a sanity check. + * + * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be + * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs + * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES + * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. + */ + if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || + ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || + ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { + PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); + return (0); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ + mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ + (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); + + /* + * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then + * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the + * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && + sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) + { + state->sp = sp; + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + + /* + * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object + * needs to be created. + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( + ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); + } + + if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) + { + /* + * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to + * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. + */ + if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + } + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + /* now initialize the context with a new key */ + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +/* + * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a + * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session + * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so + * that it needs not be recreated. + * + * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this + * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return + * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good + * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix + * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient + * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long outl = inl; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; + + if (!inl) + return (1); + + /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ + if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) + return (0); + + if (ctx->encrypt) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + else + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always + * the same size of input. + * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with + * correctly aligned buffers. + */ + if (inl != outl) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() + * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's + * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but + * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't + * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with + * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, + * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used + * context is initialized without finalizing it first. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; + CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get + * rid of the context. + */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + state->sp = NULL; + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with + * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the + * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!cipher) + return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_des_ede3_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; + break; + case NID_des_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; + break; + case NID_bf_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; + break; + case NID_rc4: + *cipher = &pk11_rc4; + break; + default: +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs + * here are not constants. + */ + if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + *cipher = NULL; + break; + } + return (*cipher != NULL); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!digest) + return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_md5: + *digest = &pk11_md5; + break; + case NID_sha1: + *digest = &pk11_sha1; + break; + case NID_sha224: + *digest = &pk11_sha224; + break; + case NID_sha256: + *digest = &pk11_sha256; + break; + case NID_sha384: + *digest = &pk11_sha384; + break; + case NID_sha512: + *digest = &pk11_sha512; + break; + default: + *digest = NULL; + break; + } + return (*digest != NULL); + } + + +/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, + }; + + /* + * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions + * can use the key handles. Here is why: + * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. + * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. + * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with + * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES + * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and + * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session + * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key + * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to + * terminate the active operation. + */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; + a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Save the key information used in this session. + * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. + */ + sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? + PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len; + (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); +err: + + return (h_key); + } + +static int +md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) + if (digests[i].nid == nid) + return (digests[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_DIGEST *pdp; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) + return (0); + + pdp = &digests[index]; + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ + mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); + return (0); + } + + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ + if (count == 0) + return (1); + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, + count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) + { + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long len; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + len = ctx->digest->md_size; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) + return (0); + + /* + * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session + * to the pool + */ + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) + { + CK_RV rv; + int ret = 0; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; + CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + + /* The copy-from state */ + state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Initialize the copy-to state */ + if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) + goto err; + state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; + + /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + if (ul_state_len == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); + if (pstate == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, + ul_state_len, 0, 0); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, + PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; +err: + if (pstate != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pstate); + + return (ret); + } + +/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ +static int +pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; + unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not + * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory + * that might have been allocated in the token when + * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() + * will return the session to the cache. + */ + if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key + * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key + * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for + * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first + * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same + * prefix. + */ +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len) + { + if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || + memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) + { + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* + * The secret key object is created in the + * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). + */ + if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, + sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + + return (ret); + } + + +/* + * Public key mechanisms optionally supported + * + * CKM_RSA_X_509 + * CKM_RSA_PKCS + * CKM_DSA + * + * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a + * public key slot. + * + * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported + * + * CKM_DES3_CBC + * CKM_DES_CBC + * CKM_AES_CBC + * CKM_DES3_ECB + * CKM_DES_ECB + * CKM_AES_ECB + * CKM_AES_CTR + * CKM_RC4 + * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC + * + * Digests optionally supported + * + * CKM_MD5 + * CKM_SHA_1 + * CKM_SHA224 + * CKM_SHA256 + * CKM_SHA384 + * CKM_SHA512 + * + * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which + * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of + * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global + * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key + * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. + */ +static int +pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) + { + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar; + CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + int slot_n_cipher = 0; + int slot_n_digest = 0; + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; + int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + int current_slot_n_digest = 0; + + int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; + int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; + + /* let's initialize the output parameter */ + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 0; + + /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + return (0); + } + + /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + /* Check if slot has random support. */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, + * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_DSA. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, + &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and + * derivation. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) + { + slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (!found_candidate_slot && + (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; + pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; + found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if + * RSA keys by reference feature is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", + PK11_DBG); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + best_slot_sofar); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); + } +#else + } /* if */ +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } /* for */ + + if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + { + pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + } + + found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + best_slot_sofar = 0; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + current_slot_n_digest = 0; + (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); + + pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_cipher); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_digest); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", + PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than + * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, + * otherwise leave it where it is. + */ + if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > + (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", + PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; + cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; + digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; + (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, + sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, + sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); + OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 1; + return (1); + } + +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids, int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = + ciphers[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = + digests[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) + { + ASN1_OBJECT *o; + int nid; + + if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", + 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) + { + return (0); + } + + /* will return NID_undef on error */ + nid = OBJ_add_object(o); + ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); + + return (nid); + } + +/* + * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we + * have to help ourselves here. + */ +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) + { + /* are we already set? */ + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) + return (1); + + /* + * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just + * follow the format of those that exist. + */ + if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; + return (1); + +err: + PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, + ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, + local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); + } + } + +/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, + current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); + } + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library + * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation + * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code + * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the + * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some + * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a + * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, + * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the + * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte + * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products + * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression + * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the + * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. + * + * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for + * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same + * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 + * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without + * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use + * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since + * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said + * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with + * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code + * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for + * asymmetric operations. + * + * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what + * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can + * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be + * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, + * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. + * + * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find + * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric + * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table + * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays + * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the + * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token + * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more + * information. + * + * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined + * the code won't be used. + */ +#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#else +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#endif + +/* + * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, + * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware + * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. + */ +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + void *handle; + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; + int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif + /* + * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own + * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions + * from the top-level PKCS#11 library. + */ + if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + /* this means empty tables */ + hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; + hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also + * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the + * search. + */ + hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; + hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; + tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); + tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); + if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef + * is zero now. + */ + for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; + for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are + * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. + */ + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); + pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); + } + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by + * dlclose(3C). + */ +#if 0 + pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + (void) dlclose(handle); + hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; + hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + +err: + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); + if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); + + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., + * non-existent). + */ +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) + { + int i = 0; + + /* + * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new + * table. + */ + if (nid_table == NULL) + return (1); + + /* + * the table is never full, there is always at least one + * NID_undef. + */ + while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) + { + if (nid_table[i++] == nid) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + } + + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |